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ABSTRACT 
 Mass migrations at the southwest border are nothing new, but surges in 
unaccompanied minors and family units crossing the border in short periods are 
increasingly overwhelming the U.S. government’s capacity to respond, resulting in 
humanitarian, legal, and financial consequences. Due to the complex motivations for 
migrating, U.S. immigration authorities currently lack the ability to anticipate 
mass-migration events, making it difficult to prepare for them. This thesis poses the 
question of how the U.S. government can improve its foresight capacity to anticipate and 
manage mass-migration events. This thesis does not model mass-migration events, but 
rather demonstrates that such work is feasible and necessary. This analysis uses 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as a framework to organize the reasons for migration and 
offers ways to quantify such factors. Next, it explores available technologies that could 
increase the accuracy of migration forecasting and various modeling methods that could 
be used to synthesize such data. This thesis then examines strategic foresight units across 
governments, identifying best practices that could be used to build out the capacity to 
conduct strategic forecasting within the mass-migration sphere. Ultimately, this thesis 
finds that strategic foresight vis-à-vis mass migration is possible and recommends 
creating a strategic foresight unit tasked with anticipating mass-migration flows. 
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Mass migrations arriving at the southwest border of the United States are 
increasingly overwhelming the U.S. government’s ability to respond. When these events 
overwhelm U.S. immigration authorities, they can exacerbate security vulnerabilities. For 
example, gang members, criminals, terrorists, and foreign fugitives can all exploit the 
porous southwest border, especially during a mass-migration event when resources are 
stretched thin. This thesis advocates building the capacity for the U.S. government to 
conduct strategic foresight work to anticipate mass-migration flows before they occur. It 
argues that such foresight is not only feasible but also necessary to prevent future security 
threats, financial costs, and humanitarian crises along the southwest border.  
The goal of strategic foresight work “is to create an evidence base to lead strategic 
planning.”1 There are four main challenges in conducting strategic forecasting that this 
thesis attempts to overcome: data availability, issue complexity, analytic process, and 
institutional constraints.2 To overcome the challenges of complexity and data availability, 
the United States should work to identify the key drivers of international migration utilizing 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as a framework for identifying unmet necessities in the 
populace. Additionally, analysts should use technological resources, such as internet search 
analysis and satellite imagery. Once the key drivers have been identified, the United States 
should establish metrics for monitoring those drivers with the aim of detecting when 
migration stressors reach thresholds and intervening when necessary to prevent mass-
migration flows.3 
 
1 Iana Dreyer and Gerald Stang, “Foresight in Governments—Practices and Trends around the 
World,” in YES 2013: EUISS Yearbook of European Security, ed. Antonio Missiroli (Paris: European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013), 13, https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/euiss-yearbook-
european-security-2013. 
2 Thomas Juneau, Strategic Analysis in Support of International Policy Making (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 60. 
3 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kate Hooper, Building Partnerships to Respond to the Next 
Decade’s Migration Challenges (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2017), 48, https://www.
migrationpolicy.org/research/building-partnerships-respond-next-decades-migration-challenges. 
xiv 
Analyzing migration factors through the lens of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
reveals several key findings that could assist the U.S. government in evaluating which 
countries are at risk of mass migration and where migrants may travel. Mass migrations 
are more likely to come from countries with underperforming economies and those 
involved in conflict.4 They are also more likely to come from countries that rate poorly on 
the corruption perception index, which reflects the level of crime and corruption a country 
is experiencing.5 Therefore, migrants tend to be drawn to countries that are more lawful 
and less corrupt than their original countries. Also, migrants are drawn toward locations 
where they have family or cultural connections. Finally, climate change should be expected 
to exacerbate these migration stressors.  
Next, the thesis examines emerging technologies that could be used to help improve 
the accuracy of migration anticipation, namely satellite technology, internet search 
analysis, and cell-phone tower tracking. Scientists have used satellites to detect migration 
stressors such as water scarcity, disease, and crop failure before they reach their breaking 
point.6 Moreover, researchers have used internet search analysis to successfully forecast 
domestic and international migration more than one year in advance.7 Cell-phone tower 
data, too, have shown population movements in real time and estimated the total number 
of displaced persons with a high degree of accuracy.8 This paper recommends the 
 
4 Reginald E. Johnson III, “Using Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs to Identify Indicators of Potential 
Mass Migration Events” (master’s thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, 2016), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/
citations/AD1017743. 
5 Johnson. 
6 Mary D. Dysart, “Remote Sensing and Mass Migration Policy Development” (master’s thesis, Air 
War College, 2011). 
7 Allen Yilun Lin, Justin Cranshaw, and Scott Counts, “Forecasting U.S. Domestic Migration Using 
Internet Search Queries,” in Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference (New York: Association for 
Computing Machinery, 2019), 1061–72, https://doi.org/10.1145/3308558.3313667; Marcus H. Böhme, 
André Gröger, and Tobias Stöhr, “Searching for a Better Life: Predicting International Migration with 
Online Search Keywords,” Journal of Development Economics 142 (January 2020): 102347, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.04.002. 
8 Linus Bengtsson et al., “Improved Response to Disasters and Outbreaks by Tracking Population 
Movements with Mobile Phone Network Data: A Post-Earthquake Geospatial Study in Haiti,” PLOS 
Medicine 8, no. 8 (2011): e1001083, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001083. 
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complementary use of all three technologies to improve the accuracy of migration 
forecasting.  
Having explored the underlying factors of mass migration, ways to quantify them, 
and the technology to increase forecasting accuracy, this thesis then discusses potential 
modeling methods to synthesize the data. For example, the disparate characteristics of 
migration flows, labor trends, and asylum applications must be modeled differently.9 
Likewise, forecasting models capture different data components, so in relying on a single 
model, analysts may failure to capture nuance in the data. Several types of modeling have 
proven useful in anticipating migration movements: agent-based modeling, probabilistic 
forecasting models such as Bayesian modeling, and Markov chain models.  
Agent-based modeling is a useful tool for anticipating migration movements by 
factoring in both individual decision-making processes and the effect of relationships in 
social networks on those decisions.10 Agent-based models have utility in guessing whether 
individuals will migrate and estimating how long it will take them and where they will go. 
One of the benefits of agent-based models is that many of the researchers utilizing them in 
the migration context have published their simulation code for public use. U.S. immigration 
authorities could use this code to help simulate migration destinations along the southwest 
border. 
Another modeling method for anticipating migration trends is the Bayesian model, 
which allows for the combination of different data sources. It allows an analyst to coalesce 
different datasets, historical trends, and expert judgment coherently.11 Bayesian models 
have successfully predicted migration in various scenarios with a promising degree of 
accuracy. 
 
9 Jakub Bijak et al., “Assessing Time Series Models for Forecasting International Migration: Lessons 
from the United Kingdom,” Journal of Forecasting 38, no. 5 (2019): 481, https://doi.org/10.1002/for.2576. 
10 Anna Klabunde and Frans Willekens, “Decision-Making in Agent-Based Models of Migration: 
State of the Art and Challenges,” European Journal of Population 32, no. 1 (February 2016): 74, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-015-9362-0. 
11 George Disney et al., Evaluation of Existing Migration Forecasting Methods and Models 




Markov chain models are another method that has shown relevance in migration 
projections. Such models are network models that anticipate the next step of an agent 
assuming that the future is independent of the past.12 Notably, Markov chain models hold 
some advantages over agent-based models in terms of efficiency. Whereas an agent-based 
model may require data from dozens of files and need thousands of lines of code to operate, 
Markov chain models can be contained in a single file and require fewer than 500 lines of 
code.13  
Following the modeling discussion, the thesis turns to the task of building the 
institutional capacity for strategic foresight work in the federal government. This thesis 
explores foreign and domestic strategic-forecasting units to identify best practices in 
establishing a successful migration anticipation unit. In examining the way other entities 
conduct strategic forecasting, this thesis highlights several relevant themes that would 
apply to a mass-migration anticipation unit in the United States. First, such units 
collaborate horizontally across the government and with external stakeholders to improve 
accuracy and keep foresight at the front of people’s minds. Second, such units have direct 
access to decision-makers who can act quickly on the units’ recommendations. Third, the 
units operate with relative autonomy. Finally, having freedom from responding to today’s 
crises allows them to focus on the future. These are all factors that could be implemented 
in an American mass-migration anticipation unit. 
Ultimately, this thesis makes the following recommendations: 
1. Establish a strategic foresight unit within the Department of Homeland 
Security, tasked with anticipating mass migrations to the United States. 
2. Delegate the authority to declare a mass migration to the lowest level 
possible to expedite deployment of resources to the southwest border and 
to originating countries in anticipation of a mass-migration event.  
 
12 Joe Blitzstein, “Introducing Markov Chains,” February 28, 2020, YouTube video, 4:45, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHwyHIz6a8A. 
13 Vincent Huang and James Unwin, “Markov Chain Models of Refugee Migration Data,” 
ArXiv:1903.08255 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2019), http://arxiv.org/abs/1903.08255. 
xvii 
3. Establish an operational response unit for mass migrations along the 
southwest border.  
4. Establish appropriate funding mechanisms for the strategic foresight unit 
and mass-migration operational response unit. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the U.S. government improve its foresight capacity to anticipate and 
manage mass-migration events? 
B. BACKGROUND 
Mass migrations to the United States are nothing new. From Irish immigrants 
fleeing the potato famine in the 1840s to Cubans fleeing Fidel Castro’s regime during the 
Mariel boatlift in 1980—when 124,776 Cuban migrants entered the United States during a 
six-month period—to the wave of Central American migrants in the 1990s and the 
present-day influx of Central American family units, the U.S. immigration system has 
experienced mass migrations repeatedly over generations.1 While mass migrations in the 
2010s constituted large quantities of people, they were also qualitatively different in their 
composition of asylum seekers, family units, and migrant children. This was a distinct 
change from prior migrations, which were mostly composed of single adult males seeking 
work in the United States, and presented new challenges to U.S. immigration authorities’ 
ability to respond. Given the U.S. government’s vast history of dealing with mass 
migrations, it is surprising that it has not developed an effective mechanism for anticipating 
them. This thesis explores the question of how the U.S. government can improve its 
foresight capacity to anticipate and manage mass-migration events.  
First, it is necessary to identify the U.S. agencies involved in the immigration 
process. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) enforces immigration law at designated 
ports of entry and, to a lesser extent, through air and marine operations. The Border Patrol, 
which is part of CBP, enforces immigration law between ports of entry along U.S. land 
borders and around the coastal waters of Florida and Puerto Rico. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) enforces immigration law in the interior of the United States 
 
1 Reginald E. Johnson III, “Using Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs to Identify Indicators of Potential 
Mass Migration Events” (master’s thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, 2016), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/
citations/AD1017743. 
2 
and oversees immigration detention facilities. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) 
grants immigration benefits including asylum and refugee claims. The U.S. Coast Guard 
has limited immigration powers along maritime routes. Each agency plays a critical role in 
the U.S. immigration system and relies on cooperation among the other agencies to affect 
the mission.2  
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not have a consolidated government 
entity tasked with anticipating and responding to mass-migration events at the southwest 
border. Previously, the Joint Task Force West responded to mass-migration events. As a 
government task force, it comprised all immigration entities with a nexus to the southwest 
border. It was quietly disbanded in 2020, and no entity has since replaced it.3 However, 
even when it was operational, the Task Force failed to gain traction in terms of command 
hierarchy within DHS—as directors of the immigration agencies viewed it as a threat to 
their authority.4 Also, failing to garner the support it needed from DHS, the Task Force 
was given no authority and no access to resources to respond to mass-migration events 
absent a declaration by the president or secretary of homeland security. Resting the 
authority of these declarations in the hands of such high-ranking officials resulted in 
unnecessary delays and prevented the Task Force from leveraging an organized, 
coordinated response.  
Several agencies outside DHS also play a role in immigration: the Department of 
State grants visas, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) under the Department of 
Health and Human Services oversees the placement of migrant children and refugees, and 
the Executive Office of Immigration Review under the Department of Justice hears judicial 
immigration proceedings. In total, eight agencies under four different departments play a 
 
2 Before the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, CBP, CIS, and 
ICE were all one consolidated government entity known as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or 
INS. Older documents quoted in this thesis reference this organization, but its responsibilities fall to the 
newer agencies. 
3 Anna Giaritelli, “DHS Secretly Shuttered Obama-Era Task Force, Empowering Border Patrol Parent 




role in the U.S. immigration system. For the purposes of this paper, unless the author refers 
specifically to one of these entities, all will be referred to as “U.S. immigration authorities.” 
Second, this thesis requires the explanation of key terms used throughout the paper. 
The term “family unit” refers to noncitizen children under 18 and their parents or legal 
guardians. The current legal term used to describe children who illegally enter the United 
States without a parent is “unaccompanied alien child.” This term is defined in U.S. Code 
as follows: “a child who has no lawful immigration status in the United States; has not 
attained 18 years of age; and with respect to whom there is no parent or legal guardian in 
the United States or no parent or legal guardian in the United States available to provide 
care and physical custody.”5 While this term is still widely used within immigration circles, 
due to evolving public opinion surrounding the word “alien” and out of respect for the 
children involved, this thesis uses the term “migrant child” instead. 
Third, this paper examines illegal, or “irregular,” migrations. This term refers to 
people entering a host country without the proper paperwork or permission to do so. The 
reason this paper focuses on illegal migrations is that, historically, these have been most 
difficult to predict.6 While regular migrants are subject to visa limitations—meaning the 
United States allows only a certain number of individuals to enter each year—the same 
cannot be said for irregular migrations.7 These are the migrations most likely to overwhelm 
the U.S. immigration system and most difficult to anticipate and thus prepare for.8 
Fourth, no agreed-upon number constitutes a mass migration.9 For the purposes of 
this paper, “mass migration” is defined as any migration that overwhelms the immigration 
 
5 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2008), quoted in David Gootnick, Central America: Information on Migration 
of Unaccompanied Children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, GAO-15-362 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2015), 1, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-362.  
6 Marcello Carammia and Jean-Christophe Dumont, “Can We Anticipate Future Migration Flows?,” 
Migration Policy Debates, no. 16 (May 2018): 1–9. 
7 For immigrant visa categories not constrained by visa limitations, U.S. immigration authorities have 
established predictive methods to determine how many immigrants are likely to apply to enter the United 
States each year. 
8 Carammia and Dumont, “Can We Anticipate Future Migration Flows?” 
9 Lance Clark, Early Warning of Refugee Flows (Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1989), 
http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:3342. 
4 
system. However, the number of people it takes to overwhelm the U.S. immigration system 
varies widely by country of origin or circumstance. For example, a group of 10,000 adult 
male Spanish-speaking migrants entering within a one-week period would not likely 
overwhelm the immigration system because immigration agents are trained to speak 
Spanish and have access to many Spanish interpreters. The same cannot be said for a group 
of 10,000 Bengali migrants crossing in the same period, as access to interpreters is much 
more limited.  
Furthermore, the same cannot be said for 10,000 migrant children or family units 
entering within the same period, due to the different level of care needed for those groups 
of migrants. For example, young children need a higher level of care and attention than do 
adults—they may need diapers or more frequent bathroom breaks, among other things. 
Family units should ideally be held together for the sake of unity. This may require 
mixed-gender housing, as in the case of mothers traveling with sons or fathers with 
daughters. In this case, adequate migrant housing would quickly run out, causing the 
system to be overwhelmed. This thesis recognizes such nuances and, thus, does not attempt 
to quantify the term mass migration. 
Fifth, the writer of this paper has been careful to use only publicly available 
information for the purposes of predicting mass migrations. Current attempts to predict 
mass migration in the United States are done within the classified sphere using intelligence 
and country conditions not currently available to the public. This thesis posits that mass 
migration can be anticipated using open-source information. Moreover, beyond being 
unnecessary, classified information is unhelpful because it presents a significant barrier to 
the U.S. government’s preparation for and even knowledge about mass migrations. Many 
employees working for U.S. immigration authorities do not have sufficient security 
clearances to access classified reports. Thus, classifying the information can have the 
ill-intended effect of preventing mass-migration indicators from reaching the hands of the 
people who need them the most. For this reason, this thesis focuses solely on the use of 
publicly available information with the hopes that with broad distribution, the 
recommendations set forth here can be championed by any person or organization that sees 
the value in them. 
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1. The U.S. Immigration Process 
Most persons attempting to enter the United States as part of a mass migration do 
so via land crossing at the southwest U.S. border. This typically happens in one of two 
ways. The persons either attempt to cross the border illegally between ports of entry, thus 
placing them under the jurisdiction of the Border Patrol if detained, or turn themselves in 
to CBP at a port of entry and request asylum. In either case, non-citizens are served 
charging documents and moved to CBP processing centers. Adults who do not claim 
asylum are either voluntarily returned to their country or removed via an expedited removal 
order. Adults who cannot be returned quickly are turned over to ICE for detention or release 
into the community or, in the most serious cases, turned over to the Department of Justice 
for criminal prosecution.  
Adults or family units who have never been to the United States before and are 
claiming asylum are served removal documents and have their fear claims sent to CIS, 
which schedules a credible-fear interview. If CIS deems their fear claims to be legitimate, 
their cases are referred to an immigration judge in the Executive Office of Immigration 
Review for a removal hearing. If CIS does not deem their fear claims to be legitimate, the 
migrants must either appeal the decision to an immigration judge or face removal from the 
United States.  
Unaccompanied migrant children apprehended at the border are turned over to the 
ORR for placement. If they make a fear claim, their information is sent to CIS for a 
credible-fear determination, as with the adults. The ORR attempts to place the children 
with a sponsor. Once a sponsor is located, the ORR considers its involvement with the case 
closed—though it has in recent years conducted a 30-day outreach call after placement.10  
When migrants are placed in immigration detention or released into the community, 
ICE monitors the cases, follows up with CIS when needed on fear decisions, and ensures 
all charging documents are served for the Executive Office of Immigration Review so that 
 
10 William A. Kandel, Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview, CRS Report No. R43599 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 13, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/R/R43599. 
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migrants begin their immigration court process. ICE also monitors migrants in the 
community or in detention and oversees migrants’ cases as they move through the 
immigration court system. If a migrant is ordered to be removed from the United States, it 
falls to ICE to enforce that removal order, assuming it has the necessary staffing and 
resources to do so. 
2. Applicable Laws and Conventions 
Numerous international conventions, relevant laws, and judicial settlements shape 
the way immigration is handled in the United States. The most important ones are 
summarized here for reference. 
a. Human Rights Conventions 
In 1951, the U.S. participated in the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. This committee entered into agreements and recommendations on 
the treatment of refugees. Specifically, this committee found “that the unity of the family, 
the natural and fundamental group unit of society, is an essential right of the refugee.”11 It 
further recommended that “governments…take the necessary measures for the protection 
of the refugee’s family especially with a view to…ensuring that the unity of the refugee’s 
family is maintained.”12  
b. Federal Laws 
Two laws guide the U.S. government’s treatment of migrant children in the United 
States—the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2008 and the Homeland Security Act of 
2002. The Homeland Security Act puts the director of the ORR in charge of placing and 
caring for migrant children. It charges the ORR with finding “a sufficient number of 
qualified individuals, entities, and facilities to house unaccompanied alien children.”13 
 
11 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1967), 10, https://www.unhcr.org/
protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html. 
12 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 10. 
13 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), 2203, https://www.
dhs.gov/homeland-security-act-2002. 
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Furthermore, it specifies that placement of migrant children must be in such a way as to 
ensure the children “are likely to appear for all hearings or proceedings in which they are 
involved” and “are protected from smugglers, traffickers, or others who might seek to 
victimize or otherwise engage them in criminal, harmful, or exploitive activity.”14 The 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act further specifies that children from non-contiguous 
countries must be referred to the ORR within 72 hours. From there, migrant children are 
screened and placed in the “least restrictive setting possible.”15  
c. Judicial Settlements 
The presiding court decision determining the treatment of migrant children and 
family units in the United States is the Reno vs. Flores settlement, which governs the 
detention of minors for immigration purposes. In 1997 this court decision established 
“nationwide policy for the detention, release, and treatment of minors detained in 
Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] custody.”16 Specifically, the decision held 
that U.S. immigration authorities “shall hold minors in facilities that are safe and 
sanitary.”17 In addition, “within five days of arrest, the INS must transfer the minor to a 
non-secure, licensed facility.”18 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Mass migrations at the southwest border are nothing new, but surges in 
unaccompanied minors and family units crossing the border in short periods are 
increasingly overwhelming the U.S. government’s capacity to respond. Between fiscal year 
 
14 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2204. 
15 Human Trafficking Protection Act, H. Res.436, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/
115th-congress/house-bill/436. 
16 Flores v. Lynch, No. 15-56434, 2 (9th Cir. filed July 6, 2016), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/
appellate-courts/ca9/15-56434/15-56434-2016-07-06.html. 
17 Flores, at 7. 
18 Flores, at 7. 
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2008 and 2014, the United States experienced an eight-fold increase in the number of 
unaccompanied migrant children arrested at the U.S.–Mexican border.19  
1. Family Units and Migrant Children 
Likewise, the number of family unit cases reported by CBP has increased 
exponentially. In 2013, 14,855 family unit cases were apprehended at the southwest border, 
but by 2014, the number of family unit cases had increased to 68,445.20 These numbers 
overwhelmed the immigration system—inundating detention space, exceeding medical 
response capabilities, and causing massive delays in the court and asylum systems—but 
they were only the beginning.  
By 2019, family unit arrests at the southwest border skyrocketed to 473,682 (see 
Figure 1).21 With no coordinated government-wide effort to anticipate such events, the 
U.S. government continues to be surprised by mass-migration events. Without the ability 
to anticipate such mass-migration events, U.S. immigration officials cannot effectively 
prepare a response.  
 
19 Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by Citizenship and 
Sector (FY2007–FY2019)” (Washington, DC: Customs and Border Protection, 2020), https://www.cbp.
gov/newsroom/media-resources/stats. 
20 Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Total Monthly Family Unit Apprehensions by 
Sector (FY2013–FY2019)” (Washington, DC: Customs and Border Protection, 2020), 1–2, https://www.
cbp.gov/newsroom/media-resources/stats. 
21 Customs and Border Protection, 7. 
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Figure 1. Number of Family Unit Members Entering the United States, 
2013–201922 
Mass-migration events that surprise the U.S. government have humanitarian, legal, 
and financial consequences. For example, in 2019, despite yearly increases in the number 
of unaccompanied minors and family unit cases, the ORR—the agency charged with 
housing unaccompanied migrant children and family units—had insufficient beds available 
to house the children. At the time, they had only three facilities open that could house 
family unit cases, with a cumulative total of 3,326 beds.23 The lack of bedspace resulted 
in a bottleneck to the immigration system and prevented CBP from promptly transferring 
non-citizens to adequate housing facilities. With no place to send migrants, CBP’s holding 
facilities, meant only for temporary housing, became overcrowded, which led to unsanitary 
living conditions.24 
 
22 Source: Customs and Border Protection, “Total Monthly Family Unit Apprehensions.” 
23 Rebecca Gambler, Southwest Border: Actions Needed to Improve DHS Processing of Families and 
Coordination between DHS and HHS, GAO-20-245 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2020), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-245. 
24 Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, Management Alert—DHS Needs to Address 
Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio Grande Valley, OIG-
19-51 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, 2019), https://www.oig.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-07/OIG-19-51-Jul19_.pdf. 
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This lack of infrastructure, combined with backlogs, resulted in migrant children 
being held longer than allowed under the aforementioned Flores settlement.25 Specifically, 
Flores required the federal government to “house all juveniles detained more than 72 hours 
following arrest in a facility that meets or exceeds” specific standards, except in “unusual 
and extraordinary circumstances.”26 When the mass migration of the 2010s began, U.S. 
immigration authorities could no longer meet the stringent timelines imposed by Flores. 
By failing to adhere to these safeguards, U.S. immigration authorities have created 
a chain of negative outcomes for migrant children. For one, overcrowding in CBP facilities 
has hindered basic sanitation, which has led to unsanitary living conditions. This lack of 
sanitation combined with a “lack of effective infection control procedures” has resulted in 
disease outbreaks.27 Disease outbreaks combined with a “lack of adequate infrastructure 
for medical evaluation” within CBP facilities have resulted in more than a dozen 
hospitalizations and several deaths of migrant children in custody.28 
Furthermore, juvenile migrants have been put in harm’s way due to other systemic 
strains on the immigration system. For example, under pressure to free up detention space 
by quickly moving juvenile migrants into the care of a sponsor, the ORR began rushing 
background checks on the children’s potential sponsors.29 As a result, some children were 
placed with unfit sponsors, including child traffickers and sexual abusers.30 Others were 
forced to work or not allowed to attend school.31 Others were simply lost. In April 2018, 
a Health and Human Services official admitted in senate testimony that the ORR could not 
 
25 Flores, No. 15-56434. 
26 Flores, at 6. 
27 Mark A. Travassos, “A ‘Natural Death’: The Political Battlefield of Infections and Migrant 
Children’s Bodies,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 70, no. 12 (June 2020): 2721–23, https://doi.org/
10.1093/cid/ciz1026. 
28 Travassos, “A ‘Natural Death’”; Edith N. Nyangoma et al., “Notes from the Field: Hospitalizations 
for Respiratory Disease among Unaccompanied Children from Central America—Multiple States, June–
July 2014,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 63, no. 32 (2014): 698–99. 
29 Marjorie S. Zatz and Nancy Rodriguez, Dreams and Nightmares: Immigration Policy, Youth, and 
Families (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), https://muse.jhu.edu/book/41217/. 
30 Gambler, Southwest Border; Zatz and Rodriguez, Dreams and Nightmares. 
31 Zatz and Rodriguez, Dreams and Nightmares. 
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locate 1,475 of the 7,635 unaccompanied migrant children placed with sponsors during a 
three-month period in 2017.32 Had the U.S. government anticipated this mass-migration 
event and established surge capacity housing for the migrant children, such negative 
outcomes could have been prevented. 
2. The Public Safety and National Security Nexus 
In a 2018 report, the House Homeland Security Committee concluded the 
following: “While many migrants undertaking the long and dangerous journey to the 
United States do so seeking a better life for themselves and their families, nefarious actors 
exploit the same routes to infiltrate the Homeland.”33 The southwest border is vulnerable 
to illegal activities such as drug smuggling and terrorist activities.34 When mass-migration 
events overwhelm U.S. immigration authorities, they can exacerbate security 
vulnerabilities. Migrants are not the only ones who enter the United States via the 
southwest border. Gang members, criminals, terrorists, and foreign fugitives can all exploit 
established smuggling routes and the porous southwest border, especially during a 
mass-migration event when resources are stretched thin. 
In congressional testimony, former Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen 
expressed concern that terrorists could use smuggling routes to enter the United States 
surreptitiously.35 She noted that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant had been 
encouraging its members to enter the United States via the southwest border.36 She also 
asserted that, on average, DHS prevented 10 terrorists a day from entering the United 
 
32 Kandel, Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview, 13. 
33 House Homeland Security Committee, Stopping Terrorist Travel through Illicit Pathways to the 
Homeland (Washington, DC: House of Representatives, 2019), 8, https://cis.org/sites/default/files/2019-
01/396705631-SIA-Report-2018.pdf. 
34 Elizabeth A. Field, Southwest Border Security: Actions Are Needed to Address the Cost and 
Readiness Implications of Continued D.O.D. Support to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, GAO-21-356 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2021), 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-
356.pdf. 
35 Strengthening the Safety and Security of Our Nation: The President’s FY2019 Budget Request for 
the Department of Homeland Security: Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives, 115th Cong., 2 (2018), https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?
EventID=108191. 
36 H.R. Strengthening the Safety and Security of Our Nation. 
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States.37 The concern over terrorists utilizing the southwest border to gain entry to the 
United States has also been mentioned in homeland security risk analyses. One such report 
in 2009 went so far as to claim that the probability of a terrorist successfully entering the 
United States was very high.38  
Nevertheless, available data surrounding the terrorism risk at the southern border 
are far less convincing. DHS claims to prevent 10 known or suspected terrorists from 
entering or traveling to the United States each day—but at the same time admits that most 
of these people are attempting to enter by air.39 Between 2005 and 2018, there have been 
only five notable criminal convictions for individuals smuggling special-interest migrants 
through the southwest border.40 However, undocumented migrants, even those originating 
in special-interest countries are not necessarily terrorists.  
Furthermore, out of all terrorist attacks in the United States from 1975 to 2017, only 
nine were committed by people who entered the country illegally, and in no instance was 
anyone killed or injured.41 To give this perspective, these nine cases represent 0.000029 
percent of the undocumented migrants who entered the United States during that 
timeframe.42 Nonetheless, even one terrorist entering the United States is one too many, 
so border officials must have the time and resources to maintain orderly processing at the 
border to prevent known or suspected terrorists from entering the country.  
 
37 “Secretary Nielsen Receives Operational Briefing on Israeli Security Technology, Delivers 
Remarks at the International Homeland Security Forum,” Department of Homeland Security, June 12, 
2018, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/12/secretary-nielsen-receives-operational-briefing-israeli-
security-technology-delivers. 
38 Lawrence Wein, Yifan Liu, and Arik Motskin, “Analyzing the Homeland Security of the U.S.–
Mexico Border,” Risk Analysis 29, no. 5 (May 2009): 1, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01180.x. 
39 “Myth/Fact: Known and Suspected Terrorists/Special Interest Aliens,” Department of Homeland 
Security, January 7, 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/07/mythfact-known-and-suspected-
terroristsspecial-interest-aliens. 
40 House Homeland Security Committee, Stopping Terrorist Travel, 5, 10. Special interest migrants 
are characterized as persons from nations hostile to the United States or from areas in the world where 
terrorism is prevalent. 
41 Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status and Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 1975–2017, 




Terrorists, however, are not the only security risks attempting to gain entry to the 
United States through the southwest border. Gang members, including juvenile gang 
members, are entering, too. A whistleblower report from 2017 noted that at least 16 known 
juvenile MS-13 gang members were admitted into the United States during the mass 
migration of family units in 2014.43 Gang members, including those from MS-13, are 
responsible for a host of violent acts in the United States. As a recent example, in an 
indictment released in January 2021, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District 
of New York charged 14 MS-13 gang members with terrorism-related offenses.44 In a 
press release commemorating the indictment, then-acting U.S. Attorney Seth D. Ducharme 
stated, “MS-13 is responsible for a wave of death and violence that has terrorized 
communities, leaving neighborhoods…awash in bloodshed.”45 Likewise, each year, the 
Border Patrol arrests thousands of criminal non-citizens attempting to enter the United 
States.46 While most of these migrants are turned away at the border, those coming with 
minor children, in the absence of available detention space, may end up being released into 
the United States.  
When mass migrations strain border resources, they exacerbate cross-border 
security risks. This can result in terrorists, gang members, and criminal non-citizens 
gaining access to the United States. But humanitarian and security consequences are not 
the only negative effects of mass-migration events. The next section examines the financial 
toll exacted during a mass-migration event. 
 
43 Stephen Dinan, “Obama Admin Knew Gang Members Were Part of Illegal Immigrant Surge: 
Whistleblower,” Washington Times, May 24, 2017, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/24/
whistleblower-dhs-knowingly-let-ms-13-gang-members/. 
44 “MS-13’s Highest-Ranking Leaders Charged with Terrorism Offenses in the United States,” 
Department of Justice, January 14, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ms-13-s-highest-ranking-leaders-
charged-terrorism-offenses-united-states. 
45 Department of Justice. 
46 “Criminal Noncitizen Statistics Fiscal Year 2021,” Customs and Border Protection, August 12, 
2021, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/criminal-noncitizen-statistics. 
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3. The Financial Toll 
The failure to anticipate mass-migration events also takes a financial toll on the 
receiving country. During the 2014 mass migration of family units, the Obama 
administration submitted a $3.7 billion emergency supplemental funding request to address 
the border crisis to care for the children, fund detention and enforcement along the 
southwest border, disseminate educational campaigns about the dangers of the journey to 
the United States, conduct deterrence in the originating countries, and guide repatriation of 
migrants being removed.47  
4. Legal Consequences 
The U.S. government’s inability to anticipate mass migration have come with legal 
consequences. International agreements, national laws, and judicial settlements have been 
put in place to protect migrants, and failing to honor these agreements have reflected poorly 
on the United States.48 For example, since the Flores settlement, a judicial consent decree 
has governed the detention of minors for immigration purposes, but during the mass 
migration of family units in the 2010s, the U.S. government was sued for violating this 
legal precedent.49 Moreover, the United States was publicly shamed by the United Nations 
for its treatment of family units during this crisis.50 When the U.S. government fails to 
honor its agreements, it comes at the cost of diminishing its international reputation. 
D. PURPOSE 
The core argument of this thesis is that had the U.S. government been monitoring 
migration flows with an eye to the future, it may have prevented many of the negative 
outcomes of such events. The U.S. government can and must build out the capability to 
 
47 Zatz and Rodriguez, Dreams and Nightmares; Gambler, Southwest Border. 
48 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees; Homeland Security Act of 2002; Flores, No. 15–56434. 
49 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (9th Cir. 1993); Flores, No. 15–56434. 
50 Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Taking Migrant Children from Parents Is Illegal, U.N. Tells U.S.,” New 
York Times, June 5, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/world/americas/us-un-migrant-children-
families.html. 
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anticipate mass-migration flows. The goal of creating this institutional capability would be 
to shift the focus of U.S. immigration authorities from a reactionary to an anticipatory 
stance to responding to mass-migration events. Instead of responding after the mass 
migration has occurred—resulting in delays in supplies, infrastructure, and medical 
capabilities—the U.S. government should improve its horizon-scanning and 
strategic-foresight capabilities to get ahead of mass-migration events. By increasing the 
warning time ahead of a mass migration, the United States could prepare a more robust 
response.  
U.S. immigration authorities need time to prepare for mass-migration events. New 
screening and detention facilities must be operationalized, staffing and supplies sent to 
affected areas, and adequate public health measures put in place. These things take time. 
The lead time typically needed for the United Nations to prepare for a mass migration is 
three to four months.51 This is the minimum timeline U.S. immigration authorities should 
strive to achieve when anticipating mass-migration events. Strategies to improve this 
warning time, such as migration forecasting, advanced modeling, and emerging 
technologies, may prove useful in this effort, but increasing warning time alone is not 
enough to solve the challenges posed by mass migrations. Anticipating a mass-migration 
event solves nothing if U.S. immigration authorities do not have the command structure or 
funding in place to respond.  
While anticipating mass migrations is no easy task, and the process might never be 
perfect, with the proper data, tools, and institutional capacity, anticipating mass-migration 
events is feasible—but only if the U.S. government commits to completing this work using 
a whole-of-government response.52 Data must be gathered, analyzed, and disseminated in 
a coordinated manner. Instead of each immigration entity gathering its own information 
and developing its own plan and response to mass-migration events, U.S. immigration 
authorities should share information, partner with research institutions, and leverage their 
 
51 Clark, Early Warning of Refugee Flows, 16. 
52 Mohammed N. Ahmed et al., “A Multi-Scale Approach to Data-Driven Mass Migration Analysis,” 
in Proceedings of the First Workshop on Data Science for Social Good, ed. Ricard Gavaldà, Indrė 
Žliobaitė, and João Gama (Wadern, Germany: Leibniz Center for Infomatics, 2016), http://ceur-ws.org/
Vol-1831/. 
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collective knowledge to get ahead of such events. This can be accomplished through the 
establishment of a strategic foresight unit tasked with anticipating mass migration. 
Strategic foresight units around the world are leveraging improvements in 
technology and modeling capabilities to better anticipate and respond to mass-migration 
events. For example, Germany has a well-funded strategic foresight unit under its central 
government that projects international migration flows one year into the future.53 It has 
subsequently been recognized for its humane handling of vast numbers of international 
migrants.54 Unfortunately, no government entity in the U.S. immigration nexus currently 
examines these migratory flows and anticipates future mass-migration events. This 
inability to anticipate migration surges delays the U.S. government’s response efforts, thus 
delaying personnel deployments and misallocating resources, among other planning 
problems. Ultimately, this lack of organization prohibits the U.S. government from 
effecting an organized, timely response. 
Likewise, there is no effective command structure or funding source in place to 
respond to mass-migration events. Each agency leverages its own response when a mass 
migration occurs, using its own individual funding. This leads to a situation where no one 
is solely in charge of the border. It also promotes resource scarcity as each entity strains to 
adjust its budget to accommodate the mass-migration response efforts while sustaining its 
own operations. This lack of anticipation, structure, and funding hampers the U.S. 
government’s ability to leverage and effect a coordinated response to mass-migration 
events. Therefore, unless changes are made, future mass-migration flows will continue to 
outpace the U.S. government’s ability to respond. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A robust volume of research examines the underlying causes of international 
migration. Such literature stretches back over a hundred years and includes academic 
 
53 Carammia and Dumont, “Can We Anticipate Future Migration Flows?,” 7. 
54 Sekou Keita and Helen Dempster, “Five Years Later, One Million Refugees Are Thriving in 
Germany,” Center for Global Development, December 4, 2020, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/five-years-
later-one-million-refugees-are-thriving-germany. 
17 
research, government reports, and information from international sources such as the 
United Nations, the International Organization on Migration, and the European Asylum 
Support Office. The seminal works on this topic were written by Ernest George Ravenstein 
in the 1880s, Everett Lee in the 1960s, and Lance Clark in the 1980s.55 Notably, this 
literature review is not all-encompassing and does not strive to explain every nuance of the 
literature. Instead, it strives to explain the relevant concepts that can assist U.S. 
immigration authorities anticipate mass-migration events.  
The use of the push-pull framework in examining international migration remains 
the dominant theory for explaining the phenomenon. The push-pull theory dates back to 
the 1880s when Ravenstein published his paper on the laws of migration for the Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society.56 While he did not use the terms “push” and “pull,” preferring 
instead “dispersion” and “absorption,” his laws of migration evolved into what is today 
known as the push-path-pull factor.57 Lee then picked up on this work in the 1960s, 
solidifying it into the push-pull theory that lives on to this day.58 While scholars over the 
years, such as Lance Clark, Susan Schmeidl, and Douglas Massey, have built on this work, 
many of the core principles—such as the role of conflict and economics in a migrant’s 
decision to choose international migration and proximity being the biggest factor in 
determining where a migrant will go—have stood the test of time.  
There are several areas of consensus in the literature regarding international 
migration, namely the importance of socioeconomic factors in driving international 
migration; the presence of family and human smuggling networks; the importance of 
conflict in driving international migration, such as armed conflict, political instability, and 
violence; and geographic proximity as a significant factor in where international migrants 
 
55 Everett Lee, “A Theory of Migration,” Demography 3, no. 1 (1966): 47–57, https://doi.org/10.2307/
2060063; Clark, Early Warning of Refugee Flows. 
56 Ernest George Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 
48, no. 2 (June 1885): 167–235. 
57 Ravenstein. 
58 Lee, “A Theory of Migration.” 
18 
choose to migrate. Thus, this literature review examines the shape of international 
migration research. 
1. Economics  
For hundreds of years, researchers have recognized that economic factors play an 
important role in the decision to migrate. But coming to a consensus on which economic 
metrics are most closely correlated with migration outflows has proven far more difficult. 
Consensus exists in migration literature that wage differentials, employment rates, and 
economic growth in the destination country are the predominant drivers in migratory 
movements. This section elaborates on how migration research over the last few decades 
has led to this conclusion. 
Early researchers focused on individual cost–benefit analyses as underlying drivers 
of international migration. For example, individuals were expected to migrate when the 
advantages of relocation generated a high return on investment for their labor.59 Lewis 
proposed that migrants would continue to immigrate to destinations with higher wages and 
greater labor demands until the wage differentials no longer existed and a sense of 
equilibrium was reached.60 Sjaadstad conceptualized international migration as a lifetime 
investment decision.61 While noting the importance of income distributions in the 
originating and destination countries in the migrants’ decision-making process, he 
recognized that income distributions alone were only one part of the equation. He also 
theorized that migrants would weigh personal factors in determining the lifetime return on 
investment for international migration. These personal factors include demographics such 
as age and sex, as well as skill sets and knowledge. If the investment is deemed favorable, 
according to Sjaadstad, migration is likely.62  
 
59 W. Arthur Lewis, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor,” Manchester School 
of Economic and Social Studies 22 (1954): 139–91. 
60 Lewis. 
61 Larry A. Sjaastad, “The Costs and Returns of Human Migration,” Journal of Political Economy 70, 
no. 5, pt. 2 (October 1962): 80–93, https://doi.org/10.1086/258726. 
62 Sjaastad. 
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Borjas expanded on the cost–benefit analysis theory by conceptualizing an 
immigration market where potential migrants consider destination countries based on a 
cost–benefit analysis.63 Borjas posited that migrants consider income differentials and 
long-term returns on investment in their choice of destination. He claimed that migration 
policies in both destination and originating countries are a factor weighed by migrants as 
part of this analysis.64  
More recent studies have also noted the importance of wage differentials, 
employment rates, and economic growth in destination countries as drivers of international 
migration.65 For example, Martineau observes that increases in gross domestic product 
have been “associated with decreased probability of a country producing refugees.”66 
Conversely, Ruyssen has found that higher income and growth rates are primary attractors 
for migrants when choosing a destination country.67 Kennan and Walker have examined 
expected income as a main driver of migration.68 They theorize that people strive to 
maximize their lifetime earnings by continuously weighing the costs and benefits of 
migration to areas available to them.69 Utilizing a discrete choice econometric model and 
comparing it to longitudinal youth data, their research indicates that expected income plays 
a significant role in the migration decision-making process.70 
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Ibarraran and Lubotsky examined census data in the United States and Mexico to 
compare educational attainments of immigrants versus non-immigrants to the United 
States.71 Their research reveals that low-skilled Mexicans are more likely than high-skilled 
Mexicans to migrate to the United States.72 Interestingly, they also note a discrepancy in 
the number of migrants leaving Mexico by regional return on investment from education.73 
Namely, areas of Mexico that had a greater educational return on investment generated 
more migrants to the United States than areas where the return on investment from 
education was low.74 Their research seems to support Borjas’s theory that migrants 
conduct a cost–benefit analysis when choosing to migrate. 
However, limitations to this research also emerged. While many of these studies 
focused solely on legal migration, economic migration is fundamentally different from 
irregular or forced migration.75 Economic migrants have time to weigh the costs and 
benefits of migration, but forced migrants or refugees are displaced by events that put their 
lives at risk.76 Their movements are often sudden and unforeseen, decreasing the 
likelihood they will be conducting an economic analysis ahead of time.77 This research is 
also limited in that it assumes migrants are aware of and weigh economic data in the 
migration decision-making process. This type of in-depth analysis is more difficult to do 
in places with lower educational levels and limited access to information. 
Likewise, researchers such as Schmeidl, Johnson, and Ruyssen acknowledge that 
economic factors considered in a vacuum do not accurately predict migrant outflows. 
Johnson’s research, for example, reveals that “all countries experiencing a mass-migration 
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event were in (economic) distress; however, not all distressed countries experienced a 
mass-migration event.”78 Schmeidl, too, maintains that economic variables alone are not 
enough to effectively predict refugee outflows.79 Ruyssen points out that network effects 
also have a strong influence on migrants’ decision-making processes, and such effects must 
be included along with economic analysis to maintain accurate behavioral models. Here, 
the literature turns to network theory to help explain why some people migrate and others 
do not. 
2. Network Theory 
To explain why similarly situated people make different decisions about whether 
to migrate, researchers have turned to the importance of social connections, such as 
families, friendships, or cultural associations, in the destination country. This concept is 
referred to as network theory. Social network theory posits that people are more likely to 
migrate to places where they have social ties like “kindship, friendship and a shared 
community origin.”80 
Neto and Mullet expand on the economic theories of migration when they posit that 
the presence of a social network might influence one’s intention to migrate.81 They have 
found that the presence of social networks increased not only the likelihood of migration 
but also the wage differential and the number of employment opportunities in the 
destination country.82 This finding is important because it suggests social networks have a 
compounding effect on migration economics. Moreover, Neto and Mullet argue that any 
evidence of strong social networks must be included in migration models to enhance their 
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accuracy.83 The importance of such social networks is also verified by Ruyssen, Everaert, 
and Rayp in their examination of immigration flows between European countries. They 
reiterate the importance of factoring social networks into migration models.84  
Expanding on the work of Sjaadstad, Gross and Schmitt examine the economics 
and influencers of international migration by skill level while also factoring in network 
theory.85 They assert that for low-skilled workers, having a network of friends, family, and 
acquaintances combined with relative incomes constitutes the biggest motivator behind 
international migration.86 But having a network in the destination country is not the only 
place where the influence of family is felt in terms of international migration. The new 
economics of labor migration posits international migration as a family risk-diversification 
strategy.87 This body of research posits that intending migrants not only consider their 
personal economic return on investment for international migration but also weigh the 
economic impact on family members. This theory helps to explain why some members of 
a family choose to migrate while others do not. 
Building on the cost–benefit analysis frameworks discussed earlier, Stark and 
Levhari have suggested migration is a risk-reduction strategy. They note that economically 
vulnerable households may send a family member to an urban or international location for 
their family to have a diverse stream of income should the originating household 
experience an economic downturn.88 This is an important concept in migration literature 
because it expands the nexus of the migration decision-making process to include the 
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impact on family members.89 Migration costs money, and by sharing that cost between 
family or community members in the country of origin, the financial risk of the migrating 
family member’s not arriving in the country of origin is distributed among the household, 
again mitigating the risk.90  
Stark and Bloom expand this new economics theory to the monetary benefits of 
remittances. When migrants arrive at their destination, the benefits of the migration are 
distributed among family members in the form of remittances, thus diversifying the income 
of the group and creating a new and powerful stream of revenue to the originating 
country.91 By sending just one relative to migrate, the originating family improves its 
economic outlook in the form of remittances from the migrating family member. But more 
recent researchers, such as Winter, have argued that economic factors are not so 
straightforward. At times, improving economic conditions in the originating country can 
result in increased emigration because migrants can now afford to make the journey.92 This 
is the opposite of findings from earlier research in which the wage differential appeared to 
be such a motivating factor. Winter acknowledges this dichotomy and suggests that 
economic conditions in originating countries result in opposing effects.93 On the one hand, 
as economic conditions improve, more migrants can afford to emigrate, but on the other 
hand, there is less economic incentive to do so.94  
However, there are limitations to and criticisms of this body of research. Other than 
Central America–based studies, the bulk of this research has been conducted on legal 
migrant populations. It is unknown whether economic factors are as relevant with an 
irregular migration population. This body of research has also been criticized for the 
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assumptions researchers make regarding the knowledge and rationality of migrants. It is 
all well and good to assume that migrants take the time to complete a thorough cost–benefit 
analysis before migrating, but the odds of someone doing so when fleeing violence or a 
natural disaster seem much lower. 
3. Conflict 
Consensus exists in the literature about the significance of armed conflict in refugee 
outflows. Researchers such as Crawley, Schmeidl, Martineau, and Johnson, among others, 
have contributed to this body of research.95 However, opinions vary on what type of 
conflict causes mass migrations and on whether armed conflict is a driver or a byproduct 
of other underlying factors, such as border or ethnic disputes, resource scarcity as a result 
of climate change, or a poor economy. 
For example, Schmeidl’s research indicates that measures of general violence are 
more strongly correlated with predictions of migration flows than are institutional human 
rights violations.96 She also notes that civil wars in which a foreign military intervenes 
produce larger and longer migration outflows than do civil wars without outside influence. 
Turchin argues that conflict is a result of long-term social pressures, and by examining the 
history of socio-political instabilities and conflicts, it is possible to uncover why and when 
they occur.97 Martineau’s research indicates that aggregate conflict is associated with an 
increased risk of a country’s producing refugees.98 Johnson’s research indicates that mass 
migrations are more likely to come from countries involved in conflict.99 Meanwhile, 
Moore and Shellman observe that the greater the threat migrants face in their home country, 
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the greater the number of persons who chose to migrate.100 Likewise, Crawley has found 
conflict to be the biggest push factor driving asylees to migrate to the United Kingdom.101 
4. Proximity 
While notable exceptions exist in the literature, the role that proximity plays in 
migrants’ decisions about where to move has been documented throughout migration 
research. In 1885, Ravenstein established that “the great body of our migrants only proceed 
a short distance.”102 Stillwell validated this theory in 2016, when he found that migration 
flows decline with distance. He noted several reasons for this phenomenon, including 
financial cost, lack of knowledge about more distant destinations, and social costs of 
moving away from one’s location of origin.103  
Yet there are notable exceptions to this rule. Winders rightly points out that 
migrants from a range of origin countries have settled far beyond seemingly proximate 
locations.104 Stillwell et al. affirm that the more developed a country, the greater the 
distance migrants are willing to travel to get there.105 This finding explains why the United 
States, Germany, and Saudi Arabia—all economic generators—are in the top three 
countries for most international migrants.106  
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Despite this area of relative disagreement in the literature, the proximity factor still 
has value in this thesis. Given that migrants are unlikely to travel a considerable distance 
from their countries of origin to migrate, countries at a considerable distance from the 
United States are unlikely to produce migration in numbers sufficient to overwhelm the 
U.S. immigration system. Therefore, this proximity factor still has value for ascertaining 
which countries are likely to generate a mass-migration event to the United States. Recent 
mass migrations to the United States have all originated in countries close to the United 
States, chiefly Central America and Haiti. Likewise, crises in more distant locations, 
notably Syria and Venezuela, have produced mass migrations but not to the United States. 
U.S. immigration authorities should factor in proximity when determining which countries 
are at risk for mass-migration events. 
5. Migration Policy 
Changes in the political structure of the originating country can increase the 
likelihood of a mass migration.107 Martineau has found that a country achieving 
independence increases its likelihood of generating refugees by a factor of 15.108 Likewise, 
countries that have recently lost their freedom are 15 times more likely to produce 
refugees.109 Martineau also claims that political upheaval substantially increases the 
likelihood of a country’s producing refugees.110  
Emigration policies for the originating countries also appear to play a role in the 
decision to migrate. The perfect example of this dynamic was the Mariel boatlift, a Cuban 
mass migration triggered by Castro’s opening the port and allowing citizens to leave.111 
Another example is Cambodia in the 1970s and 1980s. During the Khmer Rouge regime, 
escaping to Thailand was almost impossible, and over one million Cambodians died, but 
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after the Vietnamese invasion, travel became relatively easy, triggering a Cambodian mass 
migration to Thailand.112  
Migration policies in destination countries or the perception of those policies can 
affect migration flows. Whether in rhetoric, changed policies on family and work visas, or 
physical acts such as closing borders, actions taken by destination countries alter migration 
flows. This was demonstrated during the mass migration of children in the 2010s when the 
perception about available permisos (permits) in the United States influenced migrants’ 
decisions to cross the border.113 
However, policies impacting migration patterns change over time, making it 
difficult to model the impacts of such changes as they cannot be based on past observations. 
However, researchers can anticipate favorable or unfavorable policy changes in the United 
States based on changes in administration and rhetoric posed by incoming presidents. For 
example, Donald Trump frequently used the slogan “build the wall”—referring to a 
physical barrier between the United States and Mexico—during his 2016 presidential 
campaign, signaling a more stringent immigration policy was forthcoming should he take 
office. Migration forecasters can monitor these political trends to anticipate a shift in 
migration due to a change in presidency.  
6. Climate Change 
Another factor that will play into mass-migration movements is climate change. 
Current estimates anticipate that in the coming decades, 24 to 70 million people will be 
displaced as a result of climate change.114 DHS’s own Climate Action Plan warns that the 
United States could see mass migrations from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean 
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as a result of climate change.115 The plan indicates that the United States may need to 
ready itself for disaster-driven mass-migration events.116  
The warnings provided in the DHS plan are already coming to fruition. In 
November 2020, back-to-back hurricanes Eta and Iota ravaged Central America, 
destroying homes and crops and displacing thousands.117 Migrant caravans from storm-
ravaged regions began forming shortly thereafter and have not yet ceased.118 The United 
States could look to countries at risk of climate change as one factor in anticipating mass 
migrations.  
While conducting this literature review, one key gap in knowledge emerged—that 
international migration cannot be predicted with the accuracy needed to drive decision-
making by analyzing social factors alone.119 Even the most accurate studies tend to predict 
whether there will be a migration outflow but not necessarily how many will leave or when 
the outflow will occur.120 This lack of specificity renders this body of knowledge of little 
use to decision-makers in need of accurate numbers and timelines to drive response or 
mitigation efforts. Emerging technologies and advanced modeling are needed to enhance 
the precision of the migration forecast.  
7. Technology 
U.S. immigration authorities could use emerging technologies to forecast and track 
international migration. Academics and aid organizations are tackling this problem from 
 
115 Department of Homeland Security, DHS Climate Action Plan (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20Climate%20
Action%20Plan.pdf. 
116 Department of Homeland Security. 
117 Sarah Marsh and Sofia Menchu, “Storms That Slammed Central America in 2020 Just a Preview, 
Climate Change Experts Say,” Reuters, December 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-
change-hurricanes-idUSKBN28D2V6. 
118 Maria Verza, “Desperation Grows in Battered Honduras, Fueling Migration,” AP News, February 
11, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/honduras-hurricane-iota-mexico-storms-immigration-3cf340e556ee
767d1dd3dce351c934b5. 
119 Susan McGrath and Julie E. E. Young, Mobilizing Global Knowledge: Refugee Research in an 
Age of Displacement (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2019), http://hdl.handle.net/1880/111127. 
120 Martineau, “Red Flags.” 
29 
many different angles. Academia, the technology industry, and a few national refugee and 
science organizations are leading the charge in research on technologies for anticipating 
mass-migration events. There seems to be wide consensus in scholarly, humanitarian, and 
government circles on the importance of anticipating and tracking large population 
movements for humanitarian and security purposes.121 The importance of establishing this 
ability was even recognized in the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees.122 Thus far, 
however, there has been little consensus on which technologies might best accomplish this 
goal.123  
This section assesses several of the most promising areas of emerging technology 
that may prove useful in anticipating migratory flows, such as satellite imagery, internet 
search analysis, social-media analysis, and cell-phone tower tracking. Each of these 
categories has scholars advocating its use. Some scholars, such as Mary Dysart, advocate 
the use of satellite imagery to sense population movement and in-country stressors, such 
as food and water insecurity and crop failures, that likely compel people to migrate.124 
Others, including Marcus Böhme, André Gröger and Tobias Stöhr, advocate the use of 
internet search analysis to forecast international migrations.125 Another camp, including 
Susan Martin and Lisa Singh, highlight the use of combined social-media analysis.126 Still 
others, Linus Bengtsson and Xin Lu, for example, recommend cell-phone tower tracking 
as the best method.127  
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a. Satellite Imagery 
Data from satellite imagery can be used to identify and predict worldwide threats 
to human survival that could trigger mass migration.128 Proponents of the use of this 
technology in forecasting international migration, such as Mary Dysart in her thesis for the 
Air War College, note that scientists can use satellites to detect water scarcity, disease, and 
crop failure.129 Analyzing the strain on food or water supplies could help U.S. immigration 
authorities determine where the next mass migration is likely to come from. However, 
critics of this technology point out that not all countries experiencing these ecological 
strains also experience mass migrations. Therefore, satellite imagery alone is not enough 
to accurately predict mass migrations.  
b. Social-Media Analysis 
Lisa Singh has pioneered the field of data analytics for migration analysis by mixing 
social-media analysis, specifically from Twitter, with traditional newspaper analysis. In 
this seminal work, she has demonstrated that social-media keyword analysis when 
conducted in the native language can improve migration forecasting accuracy. This study 
lays the groundwork for future work on social-media data-mining.130  
However, Singh’s critics have correctly pointed out that her lengthy and labor-
intensive searches of Twitter feeds have only slightly improved predictions over newspaper 
analysis alone. They reason that Twitter is used only by a small portion of the population 
in any country and, thus, is likely to miss older demographics. Also, her research took years 
to conduct and was finalized long after any migration movement had taken place, thus 
limiting its usefulness for anticipating mass-migration events.131 While this thesis 
recognizes that social-media analysis has the potential to anticipate mass-migration flows, 
due to the constraints, it does not examine social-media analysis as a viable method for 
anticipating mass-migration flows at this time. 
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c. Internet Search Analysis 
In contrast, advocates of forecasting migration using internet search analysis, such 
as Marcus Böhme and Allen Lin, have predicted international and domestic migration in 
advance using this method with a promising degree of accuracy.132 This technology is 
inexpensive, fast, and easy to use. It also acts as a reliable leading indicator that migration 
is imminent and, therefore, has drawn little criticism by fellow scholars. This technology 
could prove promising in forecasting international migration to the United States. 
d. Cell-Phone Tower Tracking 
Some scholars have begun using cell-phone tower tracking to assist in determining 
migration movements.133 Research being conducted in a variety of countries, most notably 
by the Danish Refugee Counsel, is showing that more and more, cell phones are a vital tool 
for international migrants.134 Researchers such as Bengtsson et al. note the usefulness and 
accuracy of this technology in tracking migration movements in real time to direct 
humanitarian resources to the migrants who need them.135 However, Bengtsson et al. 
admit the limitations of this approach in that some populations will be underrepresented 
using this technology alone—for example, children and elderly people are less likely to 
carry cellular phones.136 This research is also limited because, so far, such technology has 
been used only for tracking in-country migration. Navigating the use of such technologies 
across borders may present insurmountable challenges and has not yet been accomplished. 
Still, the potential posed by such technology warrants inclusion in this literature review. 
Figure 2 depicts the combined technological methods for anticipating mass migrations, as 
proposed in this thesis. 
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Figure 2. Technology for Mass-Migration Anticipation 
8. Conclusion 
From this literature review, several limitations in the literature have emerged. First, 
much of this research has been conducted in a vacuum, and few scholars have taken a 
multi-disciplinary approach to migration forecasting. Social scientists, economists, 
computer scientists, and demographers have examined the challenges from their limited 
perspectives. However, if these groups were to combine forces and their disciplinary 
knowledge, the body of research would likely expand exponentially. 
Second, little research has been conducted by practitioners in the field, such as 
border and immigration officials. Immigration practitioners are at the front lines of 
responding to mass-migration events. They may have valuable knowledge and insights that 
can be used to direct research that proves useful in shaping policy and guiding decision-
makers. The lack of contributions by such practitioners reflects a limitation within the 
research. Nevertheless, one example of a practitioner conducting valuable research is 
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Katelin Wright.137 An immigration services officer with CIS, her insight into the effect of 
climate change on mass migration and the practical solutions in preparing for such events 
represent a bright spot within the literature. Greater research from the practitioner’s 
perspective would be helpful in terms of growing this body of knowledge. 
Third, regarding technological methods, research on technology and migration is 
limited by the lack of internet use in originating countries. Nevertheless, as internet and 
cell-phone use increase worldwide, so will the accuracy of these analyses. Another gap is 
that each study seems to explore only one technology in mass-migration forecasting. No 
one has combined the technologies available to devise a comprehensive plan to increase 
the accuracy of such predictions. 
In conclusion, the importance of anticipating mass-migration events has been well 
established. However, research on the use of technology in anticipating mass-migration 
events is in its infancy. The U.S. government must collaborate with researchers, technology 
companies, and aid organizations focusing on technology to anticipate mass-migration 
events more accurately. 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore ways for the U.S. government to improve 
its foresight capacity to anticipate and manage mass-migration events. To show that 
migration forecasting is possible, this thesis references research that establishes baseline 
patterns for aiding future analysis. It first examines the different push-pull factors that drive 
migration and then discusses data that could be used to quantify such migration stressors. 
Next, with an eye to accuracy and the potential as leading indicators, the thesis explores 
technologies that could be used to improve the precision of migration forecasts, such as 
internet search analysis, satellite imagery, and cell-phone tower data. These technologies 
were chosen because they have shown promising results in forecasting mass-migration 
events. Then, the thesis presents modeling techniques that could synthesize these data 
points and technologies to anticipate mass-migration flows accurately. These modeling 
 
137 Katelin M. Wright, “The Perfect Storm: Climate-Induced Migration to the United States” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2020), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/66051. 
34 
techniques represent those used in studies that most accurately forecasted a mass-migration 
event. Notably, this thesis focuses not on the means of conducting mass-migration forecasts 
but on the feasibility of anticipating mass migrations. 
Next, complementary analysis incorporates strategic forecasting into U.S. 
immigration processes. The penultimate chapter examines strategic forecasting and future-
planning units across governments to determine best practices in forming such a unit with 
a U.S. immigration nexus. The criteria used to examine these planning units include 
accuracy of forecasting, labor intensiveness of the process used, and their ability to provide 
leading indicators of mass-migration events.  
Finally, based on the analysis, the final chapter proposes ways to incorporate a 
strategic foresight unit into DHS to oversee the immigration planning process. These 
recommendations involve the various entities responsible for mass-migration response—
ICE, CBP, CIS, the Executive Office of Immigration Review, the ORR, the Department of 
Defense, the State Department, and others—to leverage a coordinated, whole-of-
government response. The thesis concludes by detailing a plan for the U.S. government to 
improve its foresight capacity to anticipate and manage mass-migration events. 
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II. FORESEEING MASS-MIGRATION FLOWS 
Strategic planning allows analysts to look “beyond the vision of the operating 
officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the 
emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate 
them.”138 Strategic foresight work involves a broad scope of activities aimed at producing 
knowledge about possible futures: “The goal is to create an evidence base to lead strategic 
planning.”139 It uses strategies such as trend impact analysis, horizon scanning, 
early-warning systems, scenario planning, and the Delphi method. 
Trend impact analysis uses historical data to make predictions about the future 
while taking unprecedented events into account.140 It investigates possible future events 
that could affect the trend being examined.141 This method utilizes expert opinions to 
identify future events that might change the projected trend and then calibrates the 
likelihood and magnitude of such events, thus providing a basis for scenario building.142  
Horizon scanning, by contrast, aids in assessing whether an agency is prepared for 
future challenges or threats.143 It involves bringing a group of experts together to discuss 
a common problem and arrive at solutions.144 As described by the National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, horizon scanning involves a cyclical process of 
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“scanning, analyzing, synthesizing and communicating information.”145 Ultimately, 
horizon scanning strives to detect early signs of important developments by systematically 
examining potential opportunities and threats.146  
Similarly, scenario planning involves analyzing how a current situation may 
develop, or what could transpire in the future given current factors.147 Contingency 
planning falls under the umbrella of scenario planning and involves gathering a group of 
agencies together to plan a potential response for a specific mass-migration scenario.148 
Contingency planning assists in identifying resource gaps before the actual event occurs, 
decreasing the time needed to develop a response to the mass-migration event.149  
The Delphi method was developed by the RAND Corporation, a think tank in the 
United States.150 It involves using structured brainstorming among experts to make 
predictions about different trends pertaining to an issue. This method often involves 
sending out questionnaires to the experts to minimize their interactions and using a monitor 
to filter the analyses to identify trends.151 These questionnaires collect numeric data that 
can be used for quantitative analysis.152 
Early-warning systems involve collecting and analyzing information, building 
scenarios based on that information, and recommending options for preventative action and 
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interventions.153 Early-warning systems for mass migration decide on a set of warning 
signs that a mass migration is likely and then establish thresholds that indicate a mass 
migration is imminent.154 Once such thresholds are met, a set of predetermined actions are 
triggered.155 The United Nations notes that early-warning systems describe the “set of 
capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning” information 
for organizations to prepare and act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the 
possibility of harm or loss.156 These systems aim to anticipate threats against the state or 
against human integrity and livelihood.157 As the International Organization for Migration 
describes, “Early warning systems are a useful tool to react to situations on the ground and 
preemptively commit or reallocate resources.”158 These systems integrate four specific 
elements: knowledge of the risks, a technical monitoring and warning service, 
dissemination of warnings, and responses dependent on awareness and preparedness (see 
Figure 3).159 
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Figure 3. The Four Elements of an Effective Early-Warning System 
Framework.160 
The United States currently has an early-warning system in place for maritime mass 
migrations in the Caribbean. The currently active Homeland Security Task Force Southeast 
oversees mass migration through the Caribbean.161 The Task Force works together on a 
near-daily basis to look for indicators of Caribbean mass migration.162 This system allows 
for quick activation of the maritime mass-migration plan once indicators meet 
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preestablished thresholds.163 As discussed previously, no such entity or early-warning 
system exists for mass migrations from the southwest border.  
Foresight works involves weighing an array of options and overcoming analytical 
challenges. There are two different ways to approach foresight work: normative foresight 
asks which future scenarios are desirable, and exploratory foresight examines what is 
possible regardless of desirability.164 There are also two different ways to gather 
information for use in strategic foresight. The first is qualitative foresight work, which 
involves conducting interviews and discussions and examining reports.165 The second is 
quantitative foresight work, which involves looking at figures and statistics. These methods 
can be combined to give a more varied examination of what a future scenario might look 
like.166 Furthermore, strategic forecasting faces four main challenges: data availability, 
issue complexity, analytic processes, and institutional constraints.167 This discussion now 
turns to overcoming these challenges to make anticipating migration flows a reality. 
A. PUSH-PATH-PULL ANALYSIS 
Historically, illegal migration has been difficult to predict. For decades the 
preeminent theory relating to migration patterns has revolved around push-pull theory.168 
As Clair Apodaca points out, “In order to anticipate, assist, or prevent refugee flight, we 
need to identify and monitor those causes and triggering events of flight.”169 “Push” refers 
to factors that drive migrants to leave their country of origin, for example, violence, famine, 
natural disaster, or lack of economic activities. “Pull” refers to factors that draw migrants 
to a host country, such as having family members in that community or better economic 
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opportunities. A more recent addition to the theory is the path variable—“path” relating to 
whether and how migrants get to the destination country (see Figure 4). Some examples 
include distance, the presence of organized smuggling routes, and terrain. See Figure 5 for 
a depiction of the world’s busiest migration routes. 
 
Figure 4. Classic Push-Path-Pull Diagram170 
 
Figure 5. The World’s Busiest Migration Routes171 
Another factor in some mass migrations is a triggering event. While not always 
present, the triggering event—such as a natural disaster or a change in policy that makes 
the receiving country seem more welcoming—turns a migration into a mass migration. 
This factor often ups the pressure from a trickle to a massive flow. Figure 6 better illustrates 
the many nuances of the factors behind migration. 
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Figure 6. Expanded Push-Path-Pull Diagram172 
An examination of the literature—particularly on push-pull factors—helps to 
determine whether mass migrations can be predicted. Researchers have been writing about 
the causes of migration for more than a century, and their analyses of historical mass 
migrations reveal commonalities in among the push-path-pull factors.173 However, this 
research also acknowledges the complexity in the reasons behind migration and the 
difficulty in quantifying those reasons.174 
The research examining early-warning systems for mass migration is much more 
promising. The goal of such early-warning systems is to sound the alarm when the chance 
of a refugee outflow in the near future increases.175 Using an early-warning system that he 
developed, Martineau has “correctly predict [ed] whether or not a country produced 
refugees 90.6% of the time.”176 However, Martineau maintains that his early-warning 
system could become even more accurate if additional variables were considered.  
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Reginald Johnson has examined push-pull factors through the lens of Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs. Johnson draws similarities between the reasons behind mass migrations 
and the unfulfilled needs of a populace. As Maslow’s hierarchy of needs has been validated 
extensively and found relevant worldwide, this is a helpful lens for examining the 
push-path-pull factors of illegal migration (see Figure 7).177 The following sections 
examine the push-path-pull factors of migration through this lens, with the aim of 
improving the accuracy of mass-migration predictions. 
 
Figure 7. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs178 
B. PUSH FACTORS 
In conducting an analysis of mass migrations dating back to the 1800s, Johnson has 
determined “the reasons for migration have not changed. Physiological, safety and 
economic needs still dominate the reason migrants migrate.”179 Common push factors 
include famine, war, natural disasters, and more recently, gangs and crime problems. The 
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United States witnessed some of these factors in migrants following World War II and 
during the great potato famine in Ireland.180 The following subsections examine how one 
could measure and quantify the needs in Maslow’s hierarchy to analyze which countries 
fail to meet the basic needs of their people, thereby guiding the analysis to countries at 
greatest risk of mass migration.  
1. Physiological Needs 
The first tier on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs focuses on physiological needs, and 
for good reason. One cannot survive without the necessities of food, water, and shelter. 
Therefore, the inability to survive in a country of origin is likely to lead to international 
migrations. The paragraphs that follow analyze basic physiological needs and discuss how 
the U.S. government could examine unmet needs in each area. 
a. Food 
Human beings cannot survive without food, so it comes as no surprise that famine 
has been the cause of mass migrations dating back centuries.181 As climate change worsens 
and desertification continues, food insecurity is likely to become a more significant 
problem.182 Food insecurity can be measured using the global food insecurity index, which 
examines the availability, quality, and affordability of food across 113 countries.183 This 
index ranks countries in terms of food insecurity and separates them into four categories: 
best performance, good performance, moderate performance, and needs improvement. 
Bangladesh and Honduras, two countries experiencing increases in emigration, are listed 
in the moderate-performance category while Venezuela ranks last in the index with a 
needs-improvement score.184 India, whose numbers of illegal migrants apprehended at the 
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southwest border have spiked in recent years, is listed in the moderate-performance 
category.185  
However, there are other ways to measure food insecurity. One could use 
open-source satellite imagery to detect which countries are experiencing crop failure or 
desertification that will lead to future crop failure.186 The Sentinel constellation of the 
European Space Agency has such satellite imagery available, as do other private-sector 
companies such as Planet and Digital Globe.187 Researchers within the agricultural sphere 
have used satellite imagery to predict the presence of crops like corn and their output with 
a high degree of accuracy.188 There is the potential here for U.S. immigration authorities 
to use this data to determine which countries are experiencing food insecurity and are at 
higher risk of a mass migration. 
b. Water 
Access to fresh drinking water is a basic human need. Yet, due to global warming, 
countries are experiencing a growing level of water stress.189 According to Schmeidl, in 
her paper discussing remote-sensing and mass-migration policy development, “the UN had 
predicted that by 2050, water deficits would affect in excess of 2 billion people in 48 
nations.”190 The United States could examine worldwide water stress to better evaluate 
countries at risk of mass migrations.191 The United States is seeing an increase in 
immigration from several countries listed, including Eritrea and India, in the extremely 
high water-stress rankings compiled by the World Resources Institute. The U.S. is also 
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experiencing an increase in unlawful immigration from countries experiencing high 
baseline water stress, including Mexico, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, and India.192 Examining 
countries with growing water stress could be a good place to start in evaluating migration 
to the United States.  
c. Economics/Inability to Earn a Living Wage 
If a country is struggling financially, it may not fulfill the basic needs of the 
populace. Economic woes that rise to a level where people cannot buy food or pay for 
shelter can be a push factor driving out large numbers of people. Not surprisingly, Johnson 
has found that mass migrations have originated only from countries with a low per capita 
gross domestic product.193 This is one area in which the United States could quickly 
eliminate large numbers of originating countries at risk for mass migration in its migration 
planning.  
But Johnson is not the only researcher to note the correlation between economics 
and migration. Economic factors have played a strong role in mass migrations throughout 
history. They appear to have been a factor during the mass migrations of children and 
family units in the 2010s. According to Word Bank data from 2011, a significant proportion 
of Hondurans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans live below the poverty level (see 
Figure 8).194 Examining economic conditions in originating countries could help gain 
valuable information on which countries are most at risk for mass migration. 
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Figure 8. Heat Map of Poverty Rates in Central and South America195 
One way to measure the poverty level of a country is through its gross domestic 
product, the standard indicator for tracking the health of a nation’s economy. This is readily 
available information published yearly by the World Bank. However, gross domestic 
product data can, at times, be misleading. For example, both Bangladesh and Venezuela 
rank in the top 50 percent of countries in per capita gross domestic product, yet both are 
experiencing increases in migration to the United States.196 In order to gain a better picture 
of overall economic health, additional economic data points are needed. 
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Another way to measure economic viability is through a country’s unemployment 
rate, which is widely available online. Currently, Burkina Faso, a country experiencing an 
increase in illegal migration to the United States, is ranked worst in the world with a 77 
percent unemployment rate.197 Haiti is also listed in the bottom 10, with a 40 percent 
unemployment rate.198 Venezuela appears in the bottom 20, with a 26.4 percent 
unemployment rate (see Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Heat Map of Unemployment Rates in Central and South 
America199 
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Another way to measure economic viability is with inflation levels, which reflect 
the annual percentage rise in the cost of living in a country. This metric is important as it 
can indicate how much the cost of living is outpacing wages. Here, Venezuela takes the 
top spot for the highest inflation in the world with an eye-opening 19,906 percent inflation 
rate.200 Haiti is also in the top 10 with 17.3 percent inflation.201 Looking at countries’ 
economies through several metrics can better gauge which ones are experiencing economic 
difficulties at a level that could begin to trigger international migration.  
2. Safety and Security Needs 
Next on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs comes safety, which encompasses security as 
well. Safety and security needs relate to such factors as war, conflict, crime, corruption, 
and the inability of a country to protect its citizens from harm. This is an area where 
measurable data and markers are plentiful.  
a. War/Conflict 
Numerous studies have indicated that conflict is strongly correlated to refugee 
outflow: the larger the conflict, the greater the chance of refugee outflow. One can measure 
a country’s level of conflict using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Peace 
Research Institute’s data on the presence of conflict in a country.202 The former, based out 
of a Swedish university, is the oldest ongoing data project measuring armed conflict 
worldwide and is the global community’s foremost provider of data on organized 
violence.203 
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In evaluating crime’s role in migration outflow, it is crucial to examine not only the 
crime levels in a country but also the ability of a country to protect its citizens from crime. 
Research has found that both are indicators of refugee outflow.204 One possible measure 
of meeting security needs is a country’s number of homicides. This factor appears to have 
played a strong role in the mass migrations of Central American children and family units 
in the 2010s. For example, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras all recorded homicide 
rates among the top five in the world as well as the most migrants entering the United States 
during the child migration.205  
Often a person’s perception of crime or corruption is more important than the 
numbers themselves.206 Such data are relatively easy to assemble as they are publicly 
available via Transparency International’s website.207 Transparency International is a 
global non-governmental organization that examines and reports on corruption and 
people’s perceptions of it worldwide. Johnson has found that the corruption perception 
index has the third strongest correlation to refugee outflow.208 Likewise, during the mass 
migrations of the 2010s, the three top origination countries—Honduras, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador—scored poorly on the corruption perception index.209  
3. Belongingness and Love Needs 
While Johnson has not explored belongingness and love needs in much depth, 
plenty of other researchers have examined the influence of family and social connections 
on the decision to migrate. For example, Jorge Durand and Douglas Massey have spent 
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decades examining these factors as part of the Mexican Migration Project.210 This project 
is a binational, longitudinal research project studying Mexican migration to the United 
States and examining a range of factors that influence migration between the two 
countries.211 Massey’s research demonstrates that simply knowing someone who has 
migrated increases the likelihood a person will migrate.212 Nevertheless, beyond 
influencing the decision to migrate, social factors influence which routes migrants take and 
the steps they take to get there.213 However, belongingness and love needs are more a pull 
than a push factor, so this thesis examines them further in the section on pull factors.  
4. Esteem Needs and Self-Actualization 
In ascending Maslow’s hierarchy, it becomes more difficult to quantify push 
factors. For this reason, this section combines the top-two tiers. The human development 
index, a metric developed by the United Nations Human Development Programme, relates 
to both esteem needs and self-actualization. According to its website, the index “is a 
summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a 
long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and have a decent standard of living.”214 In 
other words, it measures whether people in a country can live a fulfilling life in which they 
achieve their potential. In Johnson’s analysis, he observes that low scores on the index for 
a country have the second-strongest correlation to refugee outflow.215  
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5. Climate Change 
Climate change is increasingly being recognized as a contributor to migration 
flows. According to Abrahm Lustgarten, “Climate is rarely the main cause of 
migration…but it is almost always an exacerbating one.”216 It has the potential to worsen 
migration stressors at almost any tier of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Researchers such as 
Lustgarten, Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer have examined the potential effects of 
climate change on migration.217 
As climate change continues and temperatures increase, land will become 
uninhabitable, and people will be forced to move.218 Chi Xu et al. have coined the term 
“climate niche” to describe the temperature range and area with arable land for farming 
within which the majority of humans have been living for the last 6,000 years.219 As a 
result of global warming, the researchers estimate that by 2070, one-third of people in the 
world will be living outside the climate niche, thus threatening their health and survival.220 
As land becomes uninhabitable, migrants may have no choice but to leave their home 
countries. Researchers estimate that in the coming decades, between 24 million and 700 
million people will be displaced as a result of climate change.221 
But climate change is not just a future migration concern—it is already affecting 
migration patterns around the world. One notable example is Syria. Climate change–
induced droughts in Syria are believed to be a contributing factor in that country’s refugee 
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crisis.222 Syria had experienced years of droughts and crop failure before the civil war. 
Then, unable to farm the land, rural Syrians flooded into the cities in search of work, 
resulting in overcrowding and high unemployment.223 While not solely to blame, drought 
and unemployment are believed to have contributed to the unrest that led to Syria’s civil 
war and generated one of the largest refugee crises in recent memory.  
Climate change is also impacting migration closer to home. Climate change factors 
were an underlying issue during the Central American border surge in the early 2010s. 
Prior to the migrant caravans, farmers in Central America had been economically 
devastated by the spread of the coffee rust fungus.224 This fungus affected 70 percent of 
the coffee crop in Guatemala and cost the country 100,000 jobs.225 Likewise, in El 
Salvador, nearly 75 percent of all coffee trees were infected.226 Climate change has also 
contributed to migration movements in Mexico. In examining correlations between climate 
change, crop yields, and cross-border migration between Mexico and the United States, 
Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer have discovered that a “10% reduction in crop yields 
would lead an additional 2% of the population to emigrate.”227 With temperatures rising 
and climate change already affecting migration movements worldwide, U.S. immigration 
authorities can expect these conditions to trigger future mass migration.228 Therefore, it is 
important for U.S. immigration authorities to stay mindful of ecological stressors and the 
effects of climate change when examining whether an originating country is vulnerable to 
a mass-migration exodus. 
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In conclusion, this section has revealed several key findings that could assist the 
U.S. government in determining which countries are at risk of mass migration. Mass 
migrations are more likely to come from a country with an underperforming economy. 
They are also more likely to come from countries that rate poorly on the corruption 
perception index, which reflects the crime and corruption a populace is experiencing. 
Furthermore, mass migrations are more likely to come from countries involved in conflict. 
Finally, climate change should be expected to exacerbate migration stressors. However, 
just because a country has low gross domestic product, high conflict, or crop failure does 
not necessarily mean it will experience a mass migration, let alone a mass migration to the 
United States. While it is important to analyze factors pushing migrants out of their home 
countries, it is also important to examine factors pulling migrants toward the United States.  
C. PULL FACTORS 
In the literature surrounding international migrations, researchers have pinpointed 
several key factors that pull migrants toward a location. Migrants move to countries with 
better economies and less corruption and crime than their countries of origin, and where 
they have family or cultural connections.229  
In 2013, during the height of the mass migration of children from Central America, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), alarmed by the increasing 
number of children seeking asylum in the United States, conducted a study on the 
phenomenon.230 Its purpose was to ascertain the sudden reasons behind this mass exodus 
and determine whether these reasons rendered the migrant children a protected class. In 
interviewing hundreds of migrant children crossing the border, the UNHCR found 
similarities in the reasons the children decided to immigrate to the United States.231 The 
pull factors identified by the UNHCR correlated closely with those from historical mass 
migrations, as well as Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. The children’s main pull factors 
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included deprivation, economic opportunity, escape from violence in their home countries, 
family reunification, and educational opportunities.232 While family unit migrations are 
studied less frequently than child migrations, the factors listed in the UNHCR’s report are 
consistent with what this author has seen working face-to-face with family unit migrants 
for over a decade. 
1. Deprivation 
Interestingly, the UNHCR lists deprivation in their originating countries as one of 
five predominant reasons migrant children leave home. According to the UNHCR’s 
Children on the Run report, more than half of all children studied discussed “issues related 
to poverty and lacking basic survival necessities.”233 The report defines deprivation as a 
lack of access to adequate food, shelter, healthcare, and education, which closely align with 
Maslow’s physiological needs.234  
2. Economic Opportunity 
According to the UNHCR’s report, 51 percent of the migrant children cited 
economic opportunity as a reason to come to the United States.235 However, very few 
children listed this factor as the sole reason for coming to the United States.  
3. Crime and Violence 
During UNHCR interviews, violence in the community, fear of local gangs, and the 
country’s inability to protect children from such violence were underlying themes.236 An 
interview with a 17-year-old migrant boy from Honduras illustrates this threat of violence: 
“My grandmother wanted me to leave. She told me: ‘If you don’t join, the gang will shoot 
you. If you do join, the rival gang will shoot you—or the cops will shoot you. But if you 
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leave, no one will shoot you.’”237 According to the UNHCR, “48% of the children 
interviewed shared that they had experienced or been threatened with serious harm by 
organized armed criminal actors…state actors, or other actors within the community or that 
they had suffered such harm due to a lack of sufficient protection by the state.”238 These 
children’s experiences demonstrate a clear security issue under Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs.  
4. Desire for Family Reunification  
A desire for family and social connections is one of the biggest pull factors for 
international migration. In the immigration field, the term used to describe this 
phenomenon is diaspora, defined as the dispersion of any group of people beyond their 
homeland.239  
The locations of these diasporic communities can influence a migrant’s choice of 
whether and when to migrate. Belief systems that migrants have regarding the United 
States are shaped by their social connections and are an underlying factor in migration 
decisions.240 The presence of previous migrants from an originating country has a 
substantial impact on the number of future migrants from that country to choose a 
destination.241 Clark et al. have found that the presence of such diasporic communities 
draws on average six more immigrants annually per thousand than do locations without 
such communities.242 While researchers recognize that part of this increase can be 
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explained by immigration policies that favor family reunification, they note that the 
friends-and-relatives effect held true even in the absence of such policies.243  
Family reunification was also a significant pull factor in the mass migrations of 
Central American children and family units.244 UNHCR survey data indicate that a 
sizeable number of the Central American children already had a parent in the United 
States.245 Furthermore, the Government Accountability Office has suggested that 
economic conditions in the United States, which had improved considerably in the 2010s, 
enabled parents already in the country to affordably send for the family members they had 
left in Central America.246 These findings closely align with Maslow’s love and belonging 
needs. 
By understanding the size and locations of diasporic communities in the United 
States, the U.S. government can better predict which countries’ migrants are likely to come 
to the United States and where they might reside. For example, as of 2018, Mexicans 
account for 51 percent of unauthorized non-citizens in the United States, Mexico being by 
far the most common country of origin for non-citizens in the United States.247 However, 
56 percent of those non-citizens reside in just two states—California and Texas.248 Similar 
patterns hold true for other regions in the world. As of 2018, 84 percent of African migrants 
in the United States originated in sub-Saharan Africa.249 Of those migrants, the majority 
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originated in just five countries—Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, and Somalia.250 By 
knowing which diasporic communities exist in the United States and where they reside, the 
U.S. government can gauge which countries’ migrants are more likely to migrate to the 
United States when triggering events occur. 
5. Educational Concerns 
Both the UNHCR and Government Accountability Office have listed educational 
opportunities as a pull factor for Central American migrant children. According to the 
UNHCR, “At the very core of what could be called root causes for children leaving these 
four countries and coming to the U.S. are issues of entrenched poverty and deep lack of 
meaningful opportunity for education and employment.”251 In essence, economic and 
educational opportunities in the United States were important pull factors in the mass 
migrations of the 2010s. Notably, educational desires correlate closely with Maslow’s self-
actualization tier.  
Thus far, reasons behind the mass migrations from Central America correlate 
closely with historical migrations. For example, belongingness and love needs have 
weighed heavily on the minds of migrants throughout history, as many people have 
migrated to reunite with family members and maintain familial, cultural, and linguistic 
connections.252 This is why migrations continue long after the threats that started the mass 
migrations have passed. For example, while the Irish potato famine took place in the 1840s 
and ebbed by the early 1850s, Irish immigrants continued mass migrations to the United 
States through the 1850s and beyond to join loved ones in America.253  
In order to measure this factor, data could be gathered from CIS and CBP to see 
which countries have large numbers of persons living in the United States, thus helping the 
U.S. government predict numbers of migrants likely to join a diaspora in the United States. 
This information is useful for migration foresight: if the United States has seen many 
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migrants coming from an originating country in the recent past, it should expect more 
migrants to join those already here. However, examining push and pull factors alone are 
not enough to accurately predict the source of the next mass migration.  
D. PATH FACTORS 
While many countries experience typical push-pull factors, not all countries 
experience a mass-migration exodus. To determine which countries are more likely to 
migrate, one must examine how migrants travel from their home country to their 
destination country. The means of travel, referred to as the path factor, remains a significant 
variable in mass migrations. A path’s capacity and ease of travel are the biggest indicators 
of whether a path will allow a mass migration.254  
It stands to reason that capacity, sometimes referred to as flow rate, is an important 
factor in the path a mass migration might take.255 While speed boats can traverse the 
Caribbean quickly and at times evade Coast Guard cutters, they can only hold a small 
number of people, thus limiting the flow of migrants. Alternatively, land travel where there 
are multiple routes, methods of transportation, and entry and exit points—such as paths 
throughout Central America—has a much higher capacity or flow rate. Johnson puts it best 
when he says “a path that is easy to enter, transit and exit will have a high flow rate. 
However, even a path that is difficult to enter or exit may have a high flow rate if there are 
numerous points of entry or exit.”256 
Ease of travel naturally plays a significant role in accommodating a mass 
migration.257 Understandably, the easier the path, the more people who can make the 
journey. Conditions that are difficult to traverse—such as requiring mountainous hikes or 
long journeys on foot—will preclude elderly, impaired, or physically unfit people from 
making the journey. If the journey is costly such that it requires significant travel expenses 
like flights or the use of a smuggler, then people unable to afford to pay will not complete 
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the journey. All these factors limit the number of people that can make the journey, thus 
acting as a bottleneck to prevent a migration from reaching massive numbers. 
However, other path factors are at work, too. Historically, U.S. immigration 
authorities’ ability to process vast numbers of non-citizens was a factor that drew migrants 
to the United States.258 It could also be argued that in the distant past, the shipping industry 
was a significant factor in migration to the United States as it allowed persons to cross the 
ocean in great numbers.259 Later, the proximity of Caribbean islands and their boats at the 
ready fostered a path. However, due to greater maritime enforcement and the ability to 
process Caribbean migrants outside the United States, that path is largely closed to mass 
migrations.260 A perfect example is the Haitian mass migration of 2016. Typically, 
Haitians had entered the United States via boats, but lenient visa policies in countries like 
Brazil and Venezuela allowed a path for Haitians to enter South America legally, thus 
opening a new path to the United States.261 While some Haitians stayed to work, others 
decided to make the journey north to the United States in the first mass Haitian migration 
from the southwest border.262  
Social connections also shape migrants’ decisions about the path to take when 
migrating.263 Hatton and Williamson argue that earlier migrants reduce the risk and 
decrease the costs for future migrants, thus increasing movement along specific paths.264 
Moreover, migrants gather information from social connections in the United States to 
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determine the best path to take before traveling.265 Al-Khulaidy and Swartz’s research 
demonstrates that social connections help shape a Central American migrant’s decision of 
which entry point along the southwest border to choose.266 This pattern is especially 
prevalent following policy changes affecting migration, such as the decision to close a 
border. Figure 10 illustrates the most common migration routes through Central America 
to the United States. 
 
Figure 10. Central American Migration Routes to the United States267 
When examining paths a mass migration could take, immigration authorities should 
ask themselves a multitude of questions to determine the viability of the paths and the 
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number of migrants they can accommodate. How far must migrants travel? How much 
does it cost? How difficult is the journey? Will their country let them leave? The answers 
can help guide predictions of the number of migrants that could use such a path. It stands 
to reason that given strong push-pull factors, the easier the path, the more likely the 
migration. As most migrants immigrate to countries proximate to their home countries, it 
should come as no surprise that Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti have 
been the starting point for many recent mass migrations to the United States.268  
For some migrants traveling from overseas, the economic opportunity in the United 
States provides a strong enough pull to overcome the proximity barrier. Furthermore, 
lenient visa policies and lax immigration vetting in South American countries like Brazil 
could be relevant path factors to the United States for migrants traveling from overseas.269 
Though there are exceptions to every rule, it stands to reason that the biggest mass-
migration threats faced by the United States today are from the Northern Triangle and the 
Caribbean.  
One needs only look at path factors for Central America to understand why mass 
migrations to the United States are so prevalent from that region. Central American 
countries are the closest to the United States, and the path can maintain a high flow rate, as 
was seen during the multiple mass migrations of the 2010s. The path from Central America 
to the United States also has multiple routes, ease of travel, and well-organized alien 
smugglers to help facilitate the journey. This combination of favorable factors has made 
mass migrations from Central America so prevalent in the recent past. 
For Central American children and family units, well-organized alien smugglers 
seem to be a key factor. One notable path factor for mass migrations across the decades 
and countries of origin is knowing others who have already made the journey.270 For 
example, before the mass migration of children from Central America, the United States 
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faced a similar, though less extensive, migration from Mexico before 2012.271 Therefore, 
smuggling routes had already been established throughout the Mexican leg of the journey.  
In addition, the United States already has a significant Central American 
population. As of 2019, it was estimated that 3.5 million Central Americans were already 
living in the United States.272 This existing network makes it likely that potential Central 
American migrants already know someone who has made the journey and can provide 
them with guidance on the best path to take or the best smugglers to hire. 
1. Triggering Events 
According to Lance Clark, “Triggering events are those final critical occurrences 
that may convince significant numbers of people to leave their country.”273 Triggering 
events can be generated by an escalation in push factors or an opening of the path.274 For 
example, the Mariel boatlift event was triggered by Castro’s opening the port to allow 
people to leave.275 Another example is the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
whereby the United States experienced increased arrivals from non-citizens from 
uncommon countries due to the ease of obtaining visas for the Olympic games. In most 
situations, a triggering event is preceded by a gradual escalation of push factors in the 
originating country. The situation may intensify, affect more people, or spread to new 
areas.276 Immigration authorities could investigate the number of people affected by such 
triggering events and the numbers who could flee to hone their projections.  
Triggering events can also be large-scale incidents like natural disasters. Again, 
Haiti is a perfect example. In 2015, Hurricane Matthew hit Haiti and triggered a mass 
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migration of Haitians to the United States the following year.277 Haiti had been 
experiencing a gradual escalation of push factors, but mass migration to the United States 
did not start until after the hurricane took place. 
Compounding triggering events led to surges in children and family units at the 
U.S. border during the 2010s. First, aggressive public relations campaigns overexaggerated 
the ease of entry to the United States.278 During this time, many migrants mentioned the 
availability of permisos when asked about why they had chosen to enter the United 
States.279 They were likely referring to Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
and Jeh Johnson’s immigration enforcement priorities of 2014.280 Unfortunately, they did 
not realize that as new entrants, they were still a priority for deportation under these 
enforcement priorities.281 Likewise, for migrant children, they failed to realize that, having 
entered the United States after DACA went into effect in 2012, they did not qualify for the 
program. However, in keeping with Johnson’s findings, the migrants’ perception of their 
reception weighed more heavily in their decision-making than did the reality of the 
situation. 
Other triggering events can relate to perceptions about the future viability of the 
path.282 For example, at the end of the Obama administration, after Donald Trump won 
the election, the United States experienced another wave of Central American migrants, 
who thought they could enter before Trump’s border wall could be built. 
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2. Seasonality 
Seasonal factors and weather also influence migration flows.283 Typically, the 
number of migrants arriving at the southwest border increases between February and June 
when temperatures in the desert are more temperate.284 The Mexican Migration Project 
conducts its annual surveys in Mexico in the winter, when migrants are likely to be back 
in their originating countries.285 As poor weather restricts migration movements, 
especially extreme heat in the desert areas of the southwest border, weather variables could 
prove useful for the U.S. government in anticipating migration flows. 
3. Coping Strategies 
However, not all countries that have significant push-path-pull factors end up 
producing migrants, let alone ones to the United States. Likewise, most migration flows do 
not evolve into mass migrations.286 Therefore, a look at coping strategies in countries helps 
to narrow the list of areas most likely to generate mass migrations.  
Typically, migration is not the first option when living in one’s home country 
becomes challenging. People often exhaust a pattern of strategies before resorting to 
international migration.287 Once sufficient push-pull factors are in place to generate a mass 
migration, examining coping strategies and knowing how many people from the at-risk 
country are in each stage can help the United States increase the precision with which it 
anticipates mass migrations. 
For example, before choosing international flight, many migrants first move within 
their own country. These people are called internally displaced migrants. Typically, in-
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country migration resembles rural migrants’ retreating to cities to make money.288 This 
phenomenon was portrayed in John Steinbeck’s famous novel The Grapes of Wrath, in 
which tenement farmers migrate from their rural town in search of work. They first try 
informal refuges such as staying with family, but if they exhaust that coping strategy, they 
often move to more formal safe havens such as refugee or relief camps.289 If the situation 
dissipates, most will return home; if it does not, international migration is often seen as a 
last resort. For many migrants, their destination will be a place close to home, but if that 
does not work, some will eventually make the journey to the United States.  
The number of internally displaced migrants in each country is monitored by the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, which publishes information online.290 As of 
2018, the number of people internally displaced by violence and conflict reached 41.3 
million, the highest number on record.291 Information from the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre often closely correlates with migration numbers. For example, in 2019, 
it registered 455,900 internally displaced migrants in El Salvador.292 That same year, the 
number of Salvadorans apprehended at the southwest border of the United States rose by 
50,000 over the previous year.293 U.S. immigration authorities could examine these trends 
and note any patterns that may assist in migration foresight planning. By examining data 
on previous migration flows affecting the United States, patterns can be recognized and 
used to help anticipate future migration flows.294 Figure 11 is a graphic representation of 
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Figure 11. Push-Path-Pull Factors through the Lens 
of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
67 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter set out to overcome the challenges to strategic forecasting of 
mass-migration flows. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the first two 
challenges are issue complexity and data availability. While the reasons people migrate are 
as varied as the migrants themselves, by examining such reasons through unmet needs in 
the populace of originating countries, using Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as a framework, 
this thesis has begun to reduce the complexity of the migration forecasting process. This 
chapter also offered ways to quantify the different push and pull factors and presented data 
sources for doing so, thus beginning the process of overcoming the data availability 
challenge to strategic forecasting. By understanding the factors at play in the migrant’s 
decision-making process, and how to quantify such factors, the U.S. government could 
begin homing in on data points for anticipating mass-migration events and building the 
capacity to do so.  
However, an analysis of push, pull, and path factors alone is insufficient to predict 
mass-migration events.295 Decision-makers need more precise information about when, 
where, and how many people are coming to effectively guide their decisions.296 They will 
need to leverage technology and modeling to hone the accuracy of such metrics. 
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III. TECHNOLOGIES AND MODELING FOR ANTICIPATING 
MASS-MIGRATION FLOWS 
U.S. immigration authorities currently use the Biometric Identification 
Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) on a small scale to receive advance 
notice of migrants approaching the southwest border.297 This program involves creating 
biometric data-sharing agreements between the United States and partner nations, 
collecting fingerprints from international migrants transiting the countries, and running the 
fingerprints through U.S. immigration databases.298 These actions trigger automatic 
notifications to U.S. immigration authorities that these migrants are en route to the United 
States. Immigration officials credit BITMAP with identifying hundreds of known or 
suspected terrorists over the course of several years, but the program does not go far 
enough.299  
For one, the program does not capture information on all migrants. Most countries 
participating in BITMAP capture biometrics only from migrants suspected of being at high 
risk of terrorism or part of a transnational criminal organization. Thus, it does not 
accurately represent the volume of migrants en route to the United States. Also, BITMAP 
does not typically result in migrants’ being turned back to their originating countries. 
Instead, biometric information is captured, and the migrants continue their journey north 
to the United States. Therefore, while it serves a valuable purpose in that it lets U.S. 
immigration authorities know when high-risk non-citizens are en route to the United States, 
it does not go far enough in determining when, from where, and how many migrants are 
coming. 
BITMAP is also costly to operate. The U.S. government spends approximately $20 
million per year operating this program.300 Given that homeland security officials credit 
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the program only with identifying several hundred known or suspected terrorists in a few 
years, BITMAP does not appear to yield a good return on investment. Furthermore, the 
program is labor intensive and time consuming. The U.S. government must provide partner 
nations with the biometric devices and train foreign government officials on how to use 
them. This is a significant time and financial allotment for such a limited result. Therefore, 
this chapter posits there are less expensive, more effective ways to anticipate mass-
migration flows and explores emerging technologies that might be utilized to help improve 
the accuracy of migration forecasts.  
A. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
Several existing and emerging technologies could be explored to advance the 
accuracy of migration forecasting tools. These technologies include internet search 
analysis, satellite imagery, and cell-phone tower data. This section explores how these 
technologies could be used to improve mass-migration forecasting. 
1. Satellite Imagery 
Among the most promising technologies, open-source satellite imagery could be 
used to better predict mass migrations. Notably, data from satellite imagery can identify 
and predict worldwide threats to human survival that might trigger mass migration.301 
Scientists can to use satellites to detect water scarcity, disease, and crop failure, and in 
some cases, such satellite imagery analysis has proven more accurate than in-person 
analysis.302 Water scarcity, disease, and crop failure have the potential to stimulate mass 
migrations as people flee their homes as a matter of survival.303 Analyzing the strain on 
food or water supplies could help U.S. immigration authorities determine where the next 
mass migration is likely to come originate.  
Satellite technology could prove a valuable tool for anticipating mass migration 
given its ability to predict migration stressors before they reach breaking points. This could 
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help point analysts in the right direction for targeted mass-migration forecasting and direct 
decision-makers toward areas in need of humanitarian relief. Scientists have been able to 
predict crop yields months before the harvest is scheduled using remote-sensing 
capabilities combined with machine learning.304 For example, if the U.S. government 
knows three months before the harvest that Guatemala’s crop yield is going to be lower 
than needed to sustain the populace, researchers could start looking more closely for other 
data metrics signaling the beginning of a mass migration. With advance notice, instead of 
waiting for a mass migration to start, the U.S. government could detect these resource 
strains and work with partner organizations, such as the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, or non-governmental organizations to provide aid to help alleviate the 
migration stressors. For example, if crops are failing in Guatemala, the United States could 
send food aid to help prevent famine, potentially alleviating the need for the mass 
migration.305  
However, satellite technology also has its weaknesses. First, not all countries that 
manifest stressors experience mass migrations.306 Therefore, this metric alone is not 
sufficient to predict mass migrations. Second, this technology requires intensive data 
analysis, so people will need to review these satellite images regularly. Third, the inherent 
privacy concerns would need to be carefully considered when adopting the use of satellite 
imagery. Nevertheless, some of these limitations could be overcome, particularly regarding 
data analysis. Other government agencies or organizations, such as the U.S. Geological 
Survey, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the National Reconnaissance Office, are 
already analyzing satellite imagery.307 The potential exists for U.S. immigration 
authorities to partner with these organizations so as not to duplicate efforts. In addition, 
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privacy concerns could be mitigated by using satellite imagery solely to monitor migration 
stressors like crop health and water strain instead of migrant movements. Given that these 
are not new satellite images and the intent is to use existing ones, such concerns are a 
surmountable risk.  
Satellite imagery could be a valuable tool for anticipating mass migrations. It has 
the potential to help U.S. immigration authorities foresee and even alleviate mass-
migration flows before they occur. Scientists can use satellites to detect migration stressors 
such as water scarcity, disease, and crop failure before they reach their breaking point.308 
This technology could deliver the advance warning that U.S. immigration authorities need 
to prepare for a mass-migration event. 
2. Internet Search Analysis 
Internet search analysis is a promising new technology for detecting mass 
migration. This technology involves analyzing the number of people who are searching for 
key terms on search engines like Google. Seth Stephens-Davidowitz in his best-selling 
book on the topic, Everybody Lies, maintains that internet queries are a more reliable source 
than traditional surveys in understanding people’s desires and motivations because people 
search the internet for things they would never ask another person.309 Therefore, internet 
search analysis could prove a powerful source of information for migration forecasting.  
Additionally, researchers such as Lin and Böhme have identified search terms 
associated with domestic and international migration and successfully forecasted such 
migration using internet search analysis.310 Böhme, Gröger, and Stöhr’s research 
demonstrates that international migrants research possible routes before making the 
journey north to the United States.311 Therefore, conducting internet search history 
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analysis at the meta-level may successfully predict both domestic and international 
migration with more accuracy than leading migration metrics.312 It also proves useful 
ahead of the actual moves, sometimes one to two years in advance, meaning that a 
government could plan for and allocate resources for the impending migration.313 This 
technology has some significant advantages for mass-migration planning in that it could 
help U.S. immigration authorities estimate the number of migrants making the journey 
north and provide indications that local stressors have reached the point a mass migration 
is possible.  
Internet search technology has the potential to improve the accuracy of migration 
flow predictions. First, Google has more than one billion users worldwide, making it a rich 
resource for capturing data.314 Second, Google makes its search data available via Google 
Trends and Google Ads, allowing users to see what keyword searches are trending and 
approximately how many people are searching for them. This information can be further 
separated by country of origin, so U.S. immigration authorities may see which countries—
and which areas within those countries—are searching for key terms that might signal 
international migration.315 As Google already has such data neatly packaged, there is no 
need for heavy data analysis or the need to obtain permissions. Also, internet search 
analysis has the potential to serve as a leading indicator of mass migration.316 Migrants 
are increasingly using internet searches to find their destination and routes in advance.317 
Therefore, by monitoring migration-related keyword trends in originating countries, the 
U.S. government could estimate the number of potential migrants coming to the United 
States in the next year.  
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However, this technology is not without its weaknesses. Just because people search 
for international migration–related terms does not mean they will depart for the United 
States. Also, because the data do not predict when migrants are likely to come to the United 
States, this technology would need to be paired with other technologies or forms of analysis 
to improve accuracy. But getting indications of a mass migration with some lead time is 
not the only thing required for anticipating mass-migration flows. U.S. immigration 
authorities also need accurate information about when and where migrants will arrive and 
how many migrants are coming. For this, cell-phone tower tracking shows promise. 
3. Cell-Phone Tower Tracking 
Cell-phone tower data have the potential to be a powerful source of information on 
migration movements. Obtaining such data involves looking at the number of cellular 
phones pinging a particular cell tower. For the purposes of this thesis, the analysis involves 
cell-phone tower usage, not individual cell-phone tracking. As cell-phone usage is 
increasing worldwide, most international migrants carry smart phones on their journey.318 
Using de-identified data on cell-phone locations, researchers have shown population 
movements in real time and estimated the total number of displaced persons with a high 
degree of accuracy.319 For example, if a cell-phone tower typically has 3,000 cell phones 
utilizing it but then jumps to 10,000 within a short period, it could indicate a large number 
of people moving through the area.  
Following cell-phone tower data could help U.S. immigration authorities estimate 
how many migrants have been displaced and in which direction they are moving. This 
information may provide an indication of whether and how quickly displaced migrants will 
arrive at the southwest border. While it would not be practical to monitor cell-phone data 
around the world, this technology could prove valuable in tracking displaced migrants 
following a natural disaster or other event that might lead large numbers of people to 
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migrate—without needing people on the ground to observe them.320 Thus, leveraging this 
technology could assist humanitarian and border patrol agencies in directing appropriate 
resources and personnel to the right location in a timely manner.321  
However, U.S. immigration authorities should carefully consider the weaknesses 
of this technology. First, it does not serve as a leading indicator of mass migration. Second, 
it does not capture all populations, including children or elderly people who are less likely 
to carry cell phones.322 Third, people may raise concerns over privacy or sue the 
government over its use of this technology. Fourth, the companies or government entities 
that own the cell-phone towers might refuse to give the U.S. government access to the data. 
Fifth, cell-phone towers can become non-operational following a natural disaster. Sixth, 
cell-phone tower data can at times be misleading, as sporting events, protests, and concerts 
also produce similar data to mass migrations. Finally, some have voiced concern that this 
information could be used for nefarious purposes. For example, cartels are known to 
piggyback onto cell-phone towers in Mexico and Central America, so this technology could 
be used by cartels to exploit migrants en route to the United States.323 Nevertheless, this 
information could prove valuable in tracking displaced migrants in real time and 
determining where and when they will arrive at the southwest border. Therefore, this 
technology warrants further examination by U.S. immigration authorities. 
4. Summary 
This thesis recommends the complementary use of all three technologies—satellite 
imagery, internet search analysis, and cell-phone tower tracking—to improve the accuracy 
of migration forecasting. Satellite imagery could be used to predict in advance countries 
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experiencing migration stressors, internet queries could be used to help determine the point 
at which stressors push migrants toward international migration, and cell-phone tower data 
could be used to assess the size and direction of travel of the mass migration, thus 
improving migration forecast abilities. 
As demonstrated above, many economic, social, and political factors influence how 
and when people migrate.324 Given the number of variables involved, it is important to 
gather and analyze such data in a way that makes anticipating future events possible. The 
discussion now turns to modeling methods that may also help to anticipate future migration 
events.  
B. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF MIGRATION MODELING 
When attempting to model migration movements, one must determine whether 
people will migrate, how many migrants will move, when they will leave, and where they 
will go.325 This information will help the U.S. government prepare to meet the unique 
needs of the migrant population by allowing for better resource allocation.326 Therefore, 
this section analyzes modeling methods that can improve accuracy in each of these areas. 
They include agent-based modeling; probabilistic expert-based forecasting models, 
specifically Bayesian modeling; and Markov chain models. This section explores the 
efficacy of each modeling technique in anticipating migration flows, as well as the 
circumstances for using each method. Notably, none of these modeling methods 
unilaterally outshines the others, but each has value depending on the characteristics of the 
migration flow. 
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Several areas of uncertainty affect the accuracy of migration forecasting. The first 
relates to ambiguity surrounding the future.327 The second relates to data discrepancies 
and errors.328 For example, disparate datasets define migrants and other terms differently, 
causing discrepancies in the data. The final source of uncertainty relates to relying solely 
on one forecasting model.329 Different migration flows, for example, labor or asylum 
migrations, have different characteristics and thus need to be modeled differently.330 
Likewise, forecasting models capture different data components. Therefore, relying on a 
single model can result in failures to capture nuances in the data. Naturally, having good 
sources of immigration data over a long period is helpful for increasing the accuracy of any 
modeling method.  
1. Agent-Based Modeling 
Agent-based modeling is a useful tool for anticipating migration movements by 
factoring in both individual decision-making processes and the relationship effect of social 
networks on those decisions.331 Agent-based modeling is effective at modeling active 
objects, such as people, in relation to behavior, events, and time.332 An agent-based model 
strives to discover the reasons behind individual decisions, and ultimately, larger structures 
are uncovered based on these smaller actions and interactions made at the individual level. 
The “agent” of agent-based modeling reflects the individuality and independence 
of humans by establishing an autonomous entity within the model that makes decisions 
based on rules or procedures.333 In this way, the technique can simulate the autonomous 
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nature of human beings, yet as with humans, other agents may influence the decisions of 
the autonomous entity.334 For example, a human being is capable of making migration 
decisions on one’s own, but the decisions of others, such as close friends or family 
members who have migrated in the past, may influence a person’s decision whether to 
migrate and where to go. An agent-based models seek to replicate this independent but 
influenceable decision-making process utilizing the autonomous entity. 
Agent-based modeling holds a distinct advantage over other modeling techniques 
as it is the only method that factors in the social networks that influence the decision to 
migrate.335 As social networks significantly affect not only the decision to migrate but also 
where and how to go, encapsulating the effects of such networks is integral to a successful 
migration model. This modeling technique can be used to predict whether individuals will 
migrate, how long it will take them, and where they will go. The following paragraphs 
examine agent-based models and random forest methods, both of which have shown the 
greatest efficacy for migration purposes. 
Using agent-based models, researchers have accurately predicted whether people 
will migrate illegally to the United States.336 Azizi and Yektansani, for example, 
accurately predicted which Mexican citizens would live in the United States illegally or 
legally based on their characteristics before coming to the United States.337 Using a 
random forest model and examining primarily demographic statistics, Azizi and 
Yektansani predicted illegal migration to the United States with 90 percent accuracy.338 
Agent-based models have also shown efficacy in determining when migrants will arrive at 
their destination. Collins and Frydenlund used an agent-based model combined with game 
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theory to show that the speed and size of migrant groups affect their arrival times.339 While 
their work had limitations, they estimated that by inputting demographic information into 
their model, they could improve estimations of groups’ arrival times.340 
Furthermore, agent-based modeling has proven useful in predicting migrants’ final 
destinations. Suleimenova, Bell, and Groen used agent-based simulations to correctly 
predict more than 75 percent of refugee destinations after the first 12 days of movement.341 
By synthesizing data from the UNHCR, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
Project, and Bing Maps, the authors built agent-based simulations of refugee movements 
to determine which refugee camps the migrants would end up in.342 They applied their 
model to three separate refugee crises in Africa—the 2012–2013 conflict in Northern Mali, 
the 2013–2016 conflict in the Central African Republic, and the 2015–2016 civil war in 
Burundi. This study is notable for the accuracy of their simulations in predicting migrant 
destinations in relatively little time. One of the benefits of their study is that the authors 
published their simulation code, which U.S. immigration authorities could use to help 
simulate migration destinations along the southwest border. In a related study, Groen used 
agent-based modeling to simulate refugee movements during the 2012 Mali conflict.343 It 
was particularly valuable in that the author simulated how refugees would move based on 
different policy changes, such as countries’ closing their borders.344 Such an application 
would be useful to the United States in showing how migrant populations would move if 
certain borders or ports of entry were closed. 
Huynh and Basu used an offshoot of agent-based modeling—a random forest 
model—to predict when internally displaced persons in Syria and Yemen would migrate 
 
339 A. J. Collins and E. Frydenlund, “Agent-Based Modeling and Strategic Group Formation: A 
Refugee Case Study,” in Proceedings of the 2016 Winter Simulation Conference (Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, 
2016), 1289–1300, https://doi.org/10.1109/WSC.2016.7822184. 
340 Collins and Frydenlund. 
341 Suleimenova, Bell, and Groen, “A Generalized Simulation Development Approach.” 
342 Suleimenova, Bell, and Groen. 
343 Derek Groen, “Simulating Refugee Movements: Where Would You Go?,” Procedia Computer 
Science 80 (2016): 2254, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2016.05.400. 
344 Groen, 2254. 
80 
to a different region of their country.345 Using economic and armed conflict data and 
distance as their variables, the researchers discovered that the random forest model 
predicted migration trends with 70 percent accuracy for displaced Syrians and 74 percent 
accuracy for displaced Yemenis.346 There were a couple of limitations to Huynh and 
Basu’s study, however. As with many types of modeling, the random forest model 
occasionally failed to capture sudden spikes in movement, and it was limited by the quality 
of the dataset.347 Nevertheless, this study demonstrated the efficacy of agent-based models 
in forecasting and capturing migration movements. 
In sum, agent-based modeling is showing promise in predicting who is likely to 
migrate and anticipating when and where migrants will arrive. However, this technique has 
its downsides. It is labor intensive and requires large datasets and long, complicated lines 
of code, thus making it vulnerable to bugs. This modeling type is the only one discussed 
here that has been proven effective in anticipating migration flows. 
2. Bayesian Modeling 
Another useful modeling method for anticipating migration trends is the Bayesian 
model. This approach easily combines different sources of information, including datasets, 
historical trends, and expert judgment, in a coherent way.348 The Bayesian model has 
useful applications in that it allows one to factor uncertainty into the equation and does not 
require lengthy historical trend data for accuracy.349 This technique has successfully 
predicted migration patterns using different scenarios with a promising degree of accuracy. 
Notably, the United Nations has adopted Bayesian modeling for long-term migration 
projections.350 The European Asylum Support Office has also been testing Bayesian 
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models to reduce uncertainties in their migration forecasts.351 Their wide application in 
projecting future migration numbers warrants further exploration in this thesis. 
The Bayesian forecasting model has been examined by researchers looking to 
improve migration forecasting, including Bijak, Raymer and Wiśniowski, Azose and 
Rafferty, and Huang and Unwin. Bijak advocates the use of Bayesian models in migration 
forecasting for several reasons. He observes that Bayesian modeling enables researchers to 
combine the beneficial features of other forecasting methods in a more formal way, as well 
as quantify the degree of uncertainty in each prediction.352 The latter benefit is critical for 
decision-makers, who need to know how reliable a prediction is before acting or devoting 
resources based on a prediction. In 2019, Bijak et al. examined the accuracy of several 
migration forecasting models and found that for situations where no long-term historical 
data were available, Bayesian modeling was the only method that could produce accurate 
forecasts.353 They attribute this strength to the model’s ability to incorporate expert 
judgments into the analysis.354  
Raymer and Wiśniowski have taken the Bayesian model one step further and used 
it to forecast immigration rates by age and gender. Their work acknowledges that the age 
of international migrants remains relatively stable, allowing forecasters to simplify their 
projection models and gain greater accuracy.355 This simplification also has usefulness for 
the federal government, which can examine demographic indicators in originating 
countries to determine the number of people at the international migrating age. Similarly, 
Azose and Rafferty applied a fully Bayesian model to project global net migration rates 
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using only demographic variables.356 The strength of this research was in its ability to give 
long-term migration projections without large degrees of uncertainty.357 Their methods 
have proven accurate when compared to the United Nations’ population data, and their 
ability to quantify the uncertainty in predictions is an additional strength.358 
One disadvantage to Bayesian modeling is its computational complexity.359 Yet 
Bijak maintains that such complexity can be overcome using Markov chain simulations via 
readily available free software to produce meaningful forecasts.360 
3. Markov Chain Models 
Markov chain models are yet another effective modeling method for migration 
purposes. Markovian chain models are network models that anticipate the next step an 
agent might take, assuming that the future is independent of the past.361 Markov chain 
models hold some advantages over agent-based models in terms of efficiency. Whereas an 
agent-based model may require data from dozens of files and need thousands of lines of 
code to operate, Markov chain models can be encompassed in a single file and require 
fewer than 500 lines of code.362 This simplicity results in less runtime to operate the model, 
and a diminished chance of error resulting from bugs in the code.363 Moreover, Huang and 
Unwin used a Markov chain model to anticipate refugee movements in Burundi with 
greater accuracy than agent-based models alone. Their use of Markov chain models 
resulted in a “24% reduction in long-term prediction errors.”364  
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When choosing which model to use to anticipate a migration flow, it is important 
to select one that best captures the data. For example, in asylum flows, researchers must 
select a modeling method that does not assume consistency in migration numbers. 
Likewise, with short-term migration data, expert opinion must be factored in to improve 
accuracy. Thus, it is important to select a modeling method that can factor in expert analysis 
and does not require long-term datasets to be accurate.365 The model must be chosen with 
care, accounting for the type of migration flow and the data on hand to accurately anticipate 
migration flows. 
4. Unused Modeling Methods 
This author chose not to examine several modeling methods—including gravity 
models, deterministic demographic models, time-series extrapolation models, and 
econometric models—already in use by many developed countries to forecast 
migration.366 They have some use in predicting general numbers of regular migration 
inflows and outflows based on past numbers, but they do not examine data based on 
changed policies or circumstances in originating countries and, therefore, underestimate 
migration shocks considerably.367 Since the aim of this thesis is to examine ways to 
anticipate mass-migration flows, which by nature are migration shocks, these models are 
unsuitable for this thesis. 
Likewise, probabilistic models of migration forecasting rely on past data to 
establish baseline immigration levels and then factor in expert opinion and additional 
variables to predict trends. For these models to be accurate, they need stable, accurate data 
inputs over long periods. If the underlying data are from a shorter period or include periods 
of shocks, these models become considerably less accurate. Therefore, these models are 
better suited for anticipating long-term regular migrations and not the migration types 
discussed in this thesis.368  
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C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter took an in-depth look at the technologies that could be used to help 
increase the precision of mass-migration anticipation and the modeling methods that could 
help synthesize the information that has been identified thus far. Recall that the four 
challenges to strategic forecasting are data availability, issue complexity, analytic 
processes, and institutional constraints. This chapter sought to identify technological 
sources of additional data and different modeling techniques that could be used to analyze 
the data identified in Chapters II and III. The following chapter examines and overcomes 
the fourth challenge—institutional constraints. 
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IV. INCORPORATING STRATEGIC FORECASTING 
INTO THE MIGRATION PLANNING PROCESS 
This thesis has examined numerous migration motivators, data points, and theories 
that could prove valuable in honing the accuracy of migration projections. It has explored 
the factors that might trigger a mass migration, the demographics of the individuals likely 
to migrate, and the characteristics of the paths they might take, as well as the resources and 
technologies the U.S. government could use to predict the number of migrants who will 
make the journey and when they might come. Moreover, it has analyzed possible modeling 
methodologies to synthesize all these data into actionable information for decision-makers. 
What follows is a discussion about what it will take to build the institutional capacity to do 
this type of work in the federal government. While the U.S. government does not have an 
agency dedicated solely to the future, it could look to foreign partners and smaller strategic-
forecasting units in the United States to identify best practices in establishing a successful 
strategic foresight unit.  
A. INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS 
Government entities in Europe, Canada, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand 
are placing a premium on strategic foresight and assessing future government challenges, 
including migration. For example, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand use 
modeling to forecast migration flows and support demographic projections.369 This section 
turns to international partners for inspiration on how a DHS strategic foresight unit might 
work. 
1. Sweden, South Korea, and Canada 
For starters, Sweden has a ministry of future issues, strategy, and cooperation, 
designed to consider long-term challenges with the goal of ensuring Sweden remains 
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competitive in the future.370 Recognizing that politics and politicians tend to advocate 
short-term successes, the ministry of the future was developed to ensure that long-term 
implications and issues are never overlooked.371 As a cabinet level position, the minister 
of the future is a decision-maker with access to the prime minister, empowered to work 
horizontally across the government to ensure others ministries incorporate long-term 
implications into their decision-making processes.372 The ministry of the future 
collaborates with people from a wide variety of backgrounds, such as those in the business 
community, academia, and civilians, to include all of society’s stakeholders into the 
process.373  
South Korea is following suit with its ministry of science, ICT (information and 
communication technology), and future planning.374 Similar to Sweden, South Korea’s 
ministry works across the government and collaborates with leaders in research, academia, 
and industry to develop their goals and work to achieve them.375 Similar to Project 
Evergreen, which is examined in a later section, Korea updates its roadmaps every three 
years to keep them relevant.376 
Canada has the Policy Horizons Canada office, whose mandate is to examine the 
long-term impact of cutting-edge issues in a variety of areas.377 Policy Horizons Canada 
is a government organization that conducts foresight work with the goal of ensuring Canada 
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remains resilient to future changes.378 It incorporates scenario planning and horizon 
scanning into its strategic foresight work and strives to improve foresight literacy across 
the government and among the Canadian public.379 As with Sweden’s ministry of the 
future, Policy Horizons Canada collaborates throughout the government and with 
stakeholders. Nevertheless, it does not have access to key decision-makers, instead 
reporting to the deputy minister of employment and social development.  
2. Germany 
Germany uses its strategic foresight capabilities to anticipate migration flows, and 
its example may lend valuable insight to the United States. First, Germany is second, only 
to the United States, in its popularity as a destination among international migrants.380 
Second, Germany has a well-funded strategic foresight unit under the central government 
and uses its foresight capacity to anticipate future international migration flows. Third, 
Germany, like the United States, is vulnerable to migration flash points that reduce the 
accuracy of simple demographic forecasting.  
Germany conducts robust demographic population predictions, including for 
migration. As international migration is its largest area of population growth, the ability to 
predict the number of international migrants who will immigrate to Germany is critical for 
maintaining accurate demographic forecasts. To do this, Germany uses a combination of 
modeling and expert analysis to forecast forced migration one year ahead.381 The German 
government collaborates with external stakeholders as part of its strategic foresight work, 
funding a non-university research group called the DeZIM Institut aimed at studying, 
among other things, migration and integration.382 This institute forecasts migrations and 
publishes its findings to help guide decision-making in the government. 
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German’s strategic foresight unit predicts how many migrants will come to the 
country based on several key factors. First, it looks at regions where migrants are likely to 
originate, examining factors such as conflict and unstable political regimes.383 This helps 
Germany determine which countries are likely to generate migrants seeking international 
protection for a period. Once such countries are identified, Germany examines their 
demographics to estimate the number of migrants.384 For instance, German research 
indicates that people ages 20–39 are most likely to migrate, so the German unit narrows 
the data to people in that range to determine the maximum number of potential migrants. 
Then, Germany analyzes migratory push factors in those originating countries, meaning 
political, economic, demographic, and ecological factors that are likely to push people 
toward international migration.385 Some of the key drivers examined include rapid 
demographic growth, high levels of unemployment, political instability, and climate 
change.  
Next, Germany looks inward. It examines the international perception of Germany 
as an “economically attractive and stable country.”386 Then, the German unit looks at the 
country’s migration policy to determine how it will encourage or discourage migrants from 
selecting Germany as a destination.387 The government also considers limits on family 
reunification, alternative safe-destination countries, and changing migration policies in 
those countries to help determine whether Germany will be the migrants’ eventual 
destination. This analysis helps the government estimate how many of the migrants will 
ultimately choose Germany. Importantly, Germany also anticipates what it calls “flash 
points,” which resemble what the United States describes as shocks or black swan events. 
Looking at flash points is critical in mass-migration forecasting, as traditional forecasting 
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models that rely on demographics alone are typically upended by such events. Furthermore, 
Germany not only develops an understanding of migration drivers in countries of origin 
but also intervenes when necessary to prevent migration flows.388 For example, Germany 
continues to provide millions of Euros of humanitarian aid to Syria to stem the flow of 
migrants from that country.389  
This in-depth mass-migration forecasting allows Germany to know in advance 
where its international migrants are coming from, how many are coming, and where they 
are likely to enter. With this information, the Germans can respond effectively, ensuring 
appropriate levels of funding and sending resources to the correct locations. This ultimately 
helps Germany prevent humanitarian crises among its international migrant population. 
Germany is an excellent example of how a government can incorporate strategic foresight 
into its mass-migration planning processes, and the U.S. government could implement 
many German strategies when standing up its own strategic foresight unit. 
B. THE UNITED STATES 
In looking for inspiration to structure a strategic foresight unit, the United States 
can turn to some of its own notable future-planning departments in the federal government: 
the Office of Net Assessment and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) under the Department of Defense, Project Evergreen under the U.S. Coast 
Guard, and the Homeland Security Taskforce East under DHS.  
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1. Department of Defense 
In a capital that can be preoccupied with winning the day or kicking the can, 
the Pentagon needs an office pursuing many areas of interest with a long-
range view. 
—Jan Van Tol390 
The Office of Net Assessment is tasked with providing long-term comparative 
assessments of trends, risks, opportunities, and prospects for the U.S. military.391 It also 
conduct studies and research that anticipate the future of warfare to guide the National 
Defense Strategy and ensure the U.S. military is ready for any challenge the future 
holds.392  
Two critical factors contribute to the Office of Net Assessment’s success: autonomy 
and access to key decision-makers.393 The autonomy of the Office of Net Assessment is 
critical to its proper functioning. It is insulated from the day-to-day crises that plague other 
departments in Washington, DC, thus allowing it to remain laser-focused on its key 
mission, anticipating future threats to the United States.394 Moreover, its access to key 
decision-makers, particularly the secretary of defense, is critical to ensuring swift action 
against future threats.395 
DARPA, the other defense entity focused on the future, has one mission: “to make 
pivotal investments in breakthrough technologies for national security.”396 DARPA has 
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made huge technological contributions to society, and it is responsible for such breakout 
technologies as the internet, stealth technology, and automated voice recognition.397 Its 
contributions ensure that the U.S. military anticipates and remains at the cutting edge of 
new technology. 
DARPA benefits from several opportunities that contribute to its success. First, it 
works closely with military, public and private-sector innovators, recruiting the best 
individuals to work on its teams. It also benefits from exclusive hiring authority to recruit 
people from the private sector for three- to five-year terms to complete special projects. 
Furthermore, its three-month fellowship program allows military and civilian employees 
to work on cutting-edge technology for the Department of Defense.398 By investing 
heavily in recruitment and stressing close collaboration between the private, military, 
academic, and public sectors, DARPA can get the best minds in the country in the same 
room, working together to solve big problems. Imagine what could be accomplished if 
DHS adopted a similar collaborative structure aimed at building the capability to anticipate 
mass migrations. 
2. U.S. Coast Guard 
It is not enough to be a world-class responder anymore; the Coast Guard 
needs to become a world-class anticipator as well. 
—U.S. Coast Guard399 
The Coast Guard has also recognized the importance of incorporating strategic 
foresight into its repertoire, specifically in its Project Evergreen, which oversees horizon 
scanning and scenario planning. This program involves a continuous process for strategic 
development and renewal, as well as strives to embed this strategic intent throughout the 
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Coast Guard’s ranks.400 Working with stakeholders, it identifies potential challenges and 
develops a plan to meet them head-on. It also seeks input from a diverse spectrum of ranks 
and disciplines, both within the Coast Guard and among its private-sector stakeholders, to 
paint an accurate picture of the challenges facing the organization and the means of 
mitigating them. This important step in the process also serves to increase buy-in for 
Project Evergreen from the Coast Guard’s ranks. 
Project Evergreen is especially impressive because it aligns its strategic work with 
the terms of incoming commandants, in four-year cycles. Such a scheme allows the project 
to incorporate the commandant’s ideas and goals into the planning cycle, a critical step in 
maintaining buy-in from the Coast Guard’s key decision-maker (see Figure 12 and 13). 
 
Figure 12. U.S. Coast Guard Cycle of Strategic Renewal401 
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While U.S. immigration authorities are at a disadvantage in that the secretary of 
homeland security does not have a standing four-year term, secretaries are appointed by 
the president of the United States, who serves for four years. Therefore, this cyclical 
forecasting strategy could be incorporated into a strategic foresight unit and timed to align 
with presidential terms, thus incorporating administration goals and intentions. 
 
Figure 13. Phases of Project Evergreen402 
While military at its roots, the Coast Guard currently falls under DHS, thus 
demonstrating that strategic foresight activities can be achieved within the DHS 
environment. It is an excellent example for other homeland security entities to follow.  
3. Homeland Security Task Force Southeast 
Perhaps the best and most closely related example of strategic forecasting is the 
Homeland Security Task Force Southeast, which already conducts scenario planning for 
mass migrations through the Caribbean. It employs an early-warning system that includes 
set parameters for activation and access to resources absent a mass-migration declaration. 
Task Force Southeast has been so successful that recent triggering events in Caribbean 
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nations, such as earthquakes in Haiti and communist dissident crack-downs in Cuba, have 
not generated a mass maritime migration event. Instead, Caribbean migrants like Haitians 
and Cubans are increasingly choosing to immigrate by land through the southwest 
border.403 Task Force Southeast is a successful example of mass-migration anticipation 
that U.S. immigration authorities could strive to emulate along the southwest border.  
C. SOUNDING THE ALARM 
With all these resources available, and with a successful migration anticipation unit 
operating in the Caribbean, why does the United States continue to be surprised by 
mass-migration events along the southwest border? Why is there no Paul Revere of the 
immigration world, sounding the alarm that migrants are coming? Answering these 
questions requires analyzing institutional barriers to anticipating mass-migration events 
along the southwest border. The first limitation relates to the natural land border. The 
second is the number of commanding officers who must collaborate—the Caribbean has 
far fewer than the southwest border. The third involves the authority granted to each 
controlling entity.  
The land border is a difficult environment to track migrants. While Task Force 
Southeast can operate in international waters to intercept migrants before they arrive in the 
United States, immigration authorities along the southwest border have no such luxury. 
There is no international area to interdict migrants before their arrival in the United States. 
Land on the other side of the southwest border is the sovereign territory of Mexico, so 
conducting immigration work there without the express permission of the Mexican 
government would violate its sovereignty. Thus, if U.S. immigration authorities want to 
intercept migrants before they arrive at the southwest border, they must collaborate and 
negotiate with Mexican and Central American governments. Unsurprisingly, these 
governments are often hesitant to assist with such efforts—the expense is massive, and 
governments have little incentive to cooperate with the U.S. government. These constraints 
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prevent U.S. immigration authorities from engaging in the more-proactive activities 
enjoyed by Task Force Southeast.  
Another institutional constraint at the southwest border relates to geographic 
proximity and the number of controlling officials who must collaborate during a 
mass-migration event. Control of the U.S. southeast maritime border typically involves 
representatives from each agency from Florida or possibly the Caribbean—in other words, 
one Coast Guard commandant, one ICE enforcement and removal director, one Homeland 
Security Investigations special agent in charge, one Border Patrol chief, one CBP Office 
of Field Operations director, and one CBP air and marine director. This arrangement means 
that a handful of people, who are proximate geographically, can easily meet to devise a 
plan to address a mass-migration flow.  
In contrast, controlling agency directors along the southwest border are plentiful 
and spread far apart. The southwest border spans four states and approximately 1,933 
miles.404 It encompasses several areas of responsibility for several agencies, and each area 
of responsibility has its own agency director—an arrangement that dramatically increases 
the complexity and amount of collaboration needed to plan and respond to mass-migration 
events. For example, along the southwest border, there are nine Border Patrol sectors, each 
with a Border Patrol chief in control; four CBP Office of Field Operations areas of 
responsibility, each with its own director; five ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations 
field offices, each with its own field office director; and six Homeland Security 
Investigations special agents in charge.405 These numbers do not even account for CBP 
Air and Marine Operations, the Coast Guard, or CIS offices that must be involved. Each 
agency director controls the territory and resources within her area of responsibility yet 
works in tandem with other directors to ensure swift and efficient border operations. Given 
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the sheer number of different agencies and people who must collaborate at the southwest 
border, not to mention the geographic distance between them, it is obvious how difficult 
preparing for and responding to a mass migration can be. 
Furthermore, the lack of authority to respond is a significant institutional constraint 
along the southwest border. The former Joint Task Force West, disbanded in 2020, had to 
wait for a mass-migration declaration to activate, thus relegating it to a reactionary 
stance.406 Until a mass migration was declared, it could not assume command and control 
nor access the resources to prepare a response. In the United States, the authority to declare 
a mass migration rests solely with the president or the secretary of homeland security. 
Resting the authority with such high-ranking officials caused unnecessary delays and 
prevented Joint Task Force West from operating with foresight.  
Unsurprisingly, given the vast people from each agency who had to collaborate and 
share resources during a mass migration, the task force was plagued with bureaucratic in-
fighting.407 Without a mass-migration declaration, there was no command system in place 
to compel individual immigration entities to share resources. Given these constraints, it is 
no wonder that Joint Task Force West was limited in its ability to anticipate and respond 
to mass-migration events. Over time, lacking the ability to respond meaningfully to 
mass-migration events, the focus of the task force was steered toward combatting terrorism 
and drug trafficking. While worthy causes, this shift in focus meant no group remained to 
anticipate mass-migration flows.  
Another institutional constraint along the southwest border relates to 
communication flow. With the number of agencies involved in mass migrations, 
maintaining effective communication channels is challenging. Currently, ICE’s 
International Operations section is overseen by Homeland Security Investigations, whose 
mission is to “investigate, disrupt and dismantle terrorist, transnational and other criminal 
organizations that threaten or seek to exploit the customs and immigration laws of the 
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United States.”408 Its mission does not involve managing mass-migration flows—that 
responsibility falls to ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). Yet the 
International Operations office for ICE is managed by Homeland Security Investigations, 
which has officers stationed in 11 offices throughout Mexico and Central America.409 
These officers observe the in-country circumstances in real time. However, the 
communication flow of this information is not as clear-cut as it could be. As Homeland 
Security Investigations is not typically affected by mass-migration flows, its officers are 
not necessarily interested in them, nor do they relay information that could be useful to 
ERO in terms of preparation. 
Even when officers from ERO—the section of ICE charged with handling 
migration flows—are situated in Central American countries, their chain of command 
flows through Homeland Security Investigations. Relaying communication through an 
entity not involved in the mass-migration planning or response process can prevent 
information from reaching the people who need it. 
D. CONCLUSION 
To avoid making past mistakes, U.S. immigration officials should look to 
Homeland Security Task Force Southeast, other departments within the government, and 
other countries’ governments that already conduct strategic-forecasting work. The goal 
should be to examine other strategic foresight groups within government with an eye 
toward adopting best practices. While mostly within the military sphere, U.S. immigration 
authorities have multiple examples of successful strategic foresight units from within the 
government. DHS could strive to replicate the successes of Task Force Southeast, the 
Office of Net Assessment, DARPA, and Project Evergreen to ensure readiness for future 
mass-migration events along the southwest border.  
In examining the way other entities conduct strategic forecasting, several relevant 
themes emerged for structuring a strategic foresight unit. First, such units collaborate 
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horizontally across the government and with external stakeholders to improve accuracy 
and keep foresight at the front of people’s minds. Second, such units have direct access to 
decision-makers able to act quickly on their recommendations. Third, the units operate with 
relative autonomy—the freedom from responding to today’s crises allows them to focus 
on the future. All these factors could be implemented in an American strategic foresight 
unit. The final chapter discusses how to overcome institutional constraints and build the 
institutional capacity to do strategic foresight work in the mass-migration arena.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has examined a variety of migration motivators, data points, and theories 
that could prove valuable in honing the accuracy of migration projections. It has also 
discussed ways to overcome the four challenges to strategic forecasting within the 
migration context. Chapter II introduced the push-path-pull theory and Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs as a framework for looking at the myriad reasons people migrate. Looking at the 
drivers of migration through the lens of unmet needs in the populace is a way to simplify 
this issue, thus addressing the first challenge of strategic foresight—complexity.  
Chapters II and III addressed how to overcome the challenge of data availability. It 
first introduced data sources for quantifying push and pull factors. Next, it identified some 
technologies that could serve as additional data points and others that could enhance the 
precision of migration anticipation data.  
The next chapters sought to overcome the analytic process challenge. Chapter III 
discussed modeling methods that could be used to analyze the identified data sources, and 
Chapter IV examined ways that other agencies and governments have integrated strategic 
foresight work to get ahead of major issues. Then, best practices were identified that could 
be incorporated into a strategic foresight unit here in the United States. Finally, the chapter 
addressed institutional constraints that have prevented prior mass-migration anticipation 
units from being successful along the southwest border.  
This final chapter explores how the United States government could overcome 
institutional constraints to establish and run its own strategic foresight unit aimed at 
anticipating mass-migration flows.  
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Establish a strategic foresight unit within DHS, tasked with anticipating 
mass migrations to the United States.  
The secretary of homeland security should create a strategic foresight unit, tasked 
with mass-migration anticipation, and direct entities within DHS such as CIS, ICE, CBP, 
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the Border Patrol, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to send 
representatives from each agency to participate. The secretary should also request 
representatives from agencies outside DHS, including but not limited to the ORR, the 
Department of State, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. These representatives should have expertise in country conditions, 
migration modeling, demographics, or international aid.  
The strategic foresight unit should have the ability to conduct migration modeling 
in house or be empowered to coordinate with outside entities such as research institutes or 
universities to gain the expertise needed. It should also perform continuous scenario 
planning, timed to align with presidential election cycles, and produce a report at least 
every four years identifying migration trends, establishing the most likely countries from 
which a mass migration would originate, and updating thresholds for triggering events.  
This strategic foresight unit should build out an early-warning system for 
mass-migration events, establishing thresholds and activating specific responses once such 
thresholds are met, as the Task Force Southeast does with its Maritime Migration Plan. 
One of the predetermined responses should include activation of a command structure 
empowered to direct all immigration resources along the southwest border during a 
mass-migration event. Another predetermined response should trigger resources to 
originating countries with the goal of alleviating mass-migration stressors. 
The strategic foresight unit should be given a high degree of autonomy and 
empowered to work across the government and with external stakeholders to ensure it has 
access to the best minds possible. Ideally, it would be given the flexibility to collaborate 
with the private sector, the public sector, and academia, among others. Moreover, the 
strategic foresight unit should maintain swift access to decision-makers. As mass 
migrations can be triggered rapidly, the mass-migration team will need access to decision-
makers with the capability and financial access to deploy resources quickly to prevent or 
respond to mass-migration events. Furthermore, the unit should establish and maintain 
clear communication flows with U.S. immigration authorities to ensure that all relevant 
immigration stakeholders throughout the government are privy to the same information in 
real time.  
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2. Delegate the authority to declare a mass migration to the lowest level 
possible to expedite deployment of resources to the southwest border and 
to originating countries in anticipation of a mass-migration event.  
The secretary of homeland security, in consultation with the strategic foresight unit, 
should establish clear thresholds for declaring a mass-migration event. Preferably, such a 
declaration would occur once preestablished migration thresholds are met, independent of 
the need for a politician or political appointee to make the declaration. Such a declaration 
should trigger an operational response unit to activate and assume command and control 
of the mass-migration event.  
3. Establish an operational response unit for mass migrations along the 
southwest border. 
The secretary of homeland security should authorize the creation of a 
mass-migration operational response unit that assumes command and control of the 
southwest border in the event of a mass migration. This operational response unit should 
comprise leaders within all agencies involved with the mass-migration event, including 
CBP, ICE, the ORR, CIS, and FEMA. However, command and control should be clearly 
established so that agencies know they must obey orders and send resources as instructed 
by the operational response unit. Furthermore, this unit will need access to funding for a 
whole-of-government approach to the mass-migration event.  
4. Establish appropriate funding mechanisms for the strategic foresight unit 
and mass-migration operational response unit. 
For these units to be effective, the following funding mechanisms are 
recommended. First, establish a mechanism for DHS funding to be funneled to the U.S. 
Agency for International Development or the Department of State to prevent or alleviate 
flash points likely to trigger mass-migration flows. Like Germany’s deployment of 
resources to prevent a mass-migration flow, the strategic foresight unit, or a key decision-
maker, ought to have access to these funds to prevent mass migrations. Second, establish a 
funding mechanism independent of individual agency resources that could be used by the 
strategic foresight unit and the operational response unit to deploy resources to the border 
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in anticipation of and response to a mass-migration event. Third, establish funding for 
grants and temporary assignments to the strategic foresight unit. For the unit to have access 
to the best technology and talent available, a funding mechanism like DARPA’s should 
supply grants in support of the strategic foresight unit or temporary assignments of 
individuals to it.  
B. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
To implement the recommendations in this thesis, the secretary of homeland 
security should establish a strategic foresight unit within DHS specifically tasked with 
anticipating mass-migration flows. It is also recommended that the secretary direct all 
agencies involved in immigration or emergency management to send representatives to the 
strategic foresight unit to fulfill its goals. This would include ICE, CBP, the Border Patrol, 
CIS, and FEMA. The reason for directing instead of requesting these agencies is that the 
last time such as coordinated group was convened, it was plagued by bureaucratic 
in-fighting that prevented its work. Directing these agencies to participate and requiring 
them to send representatives with access to decision-makers will demonstrate the 
secretary’s support of this program and signal that supporting agencies should devote 
adequate time and resources to this endeavor. 
The secretary of homeland security should also coordinate with the Department of 
State, the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development to gain their support and representation in this unit. 
The U.S. Census Bureau would be helpful because it currently predicts international 
migration levels. The U.S. Agency for International Development would be helpful 
because it already has funding and in-country representatives tasked with humanitarian aid 
efforts. Through this partnership, DHS could have a mechanism to direct funding for 
humanitarian aid through already established relief mechanisms. Furthermore, the 
Department of State needs representation in this unit because it is tasked with knowing the 
conditions in foreign nations.  
The strategic foresight unit should comprise a cross section of specialties such as 
demographers, data analysts, computer scientists, and experts in country conditions. It 
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should work closely with the military, the Department of State, the intelligence sector, the 
academic community, and public- and private-sector innovators. In an ideal world, this unit 
would operate similarly to DARPA and have access to special hiring authorities that would 
allow it to recruit people from the private sector to complete special projects, such as 
creating or updating migration models. It would also benefit from access to grant money 
in allowing it to partner with and support private-sector or university programs already 
doing mass-migration anticipation work. Ideally, it would also have a fellowship program 
whereby military and civilian employees could spend several months working for the 
strategic foresight unit working on cutting-edge technology for mass-migration 
anticipation. 
For the strategic foresight unit to access the best information possible in forecasting 
migration trends, it should be privy to real-time country condition reports from the 
Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development and demographic 
data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The strategic foresight unit should also have access to 
satellite data such as those produced by the Department of Agriculture, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Reconnaissance Office so that 
it can monitor food, water, and climatic conditions that could trigger a mass migration. 
Access to these data is necessary for accurate migration forecasts. 
The secretary of homeland security should direct the strategic foresight unit to 
devise a comprehensive plan to anticipate mass-migration events. This comprehensive plan 
should include, at a minimum, a cyclical scenario-planning process and an early-warning 
system. The strategic foresight unit should be directed to write a report at least every four 
years with updated migration forecasts. Ideally, this cyclical scenario-planning process and 
report would align with presidential terms, so the incoming president’s objectives can be 
addressed in the paper, thus allowing for greater buy-in from and access to the nation’s key 
decision-maker. This product would be similar to The Future of Migration to Germany, a 
report written by the DeZIM Institut. The purpose of this report would be to inform 
decision-makers about where mass migrations are likely to originate and how many 
migrants the U.S. government is likely to see. This report will help guide planning, resource 
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allocation, and foreign aid, as finances could be directed toward addressing migration 
stressors, hopefully defusing a potential mass migration before it occurs. 
Once the mass-migration team is assembled and access to key data metrics 
obtained, the strategic foresight unit should begin building out the capacity to forecast 
mass-migration events by establishing a horizon-scanning process and developing a 
mass-migration early-warning system. In building out this capacity, the strategic foresight 
unit should first work to determine the countries most susceptible to a mass-migration 
exodus. Given that most irregular migrants to the United States originate from the Northern 
Triangle countries of Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, this author posits 
that the U.S. government should first concentrate forecasting efforts there. But the United 
States should continue to monitor, through its horizon-scanning process, other regions that 
might produce significant quantities of migrants. Significant events in any countries with 
paths to the United States warrant additional consideration by the strategic foresight unit. 
For example, events such as the Haitian president’s assassination should trigger the 
strategic foresight unit to begin monitoring metrics and evaluating the potential for a mass 
migration from Haiti.  
Once the likely countries for mass migration are established, the United States 
should work to identify the key drivers of international migration in those areas, applying 
Maslow’s hierarchy as a framework for identifying unmet needs in the populace. 
Additionally, technological resources should be utilized, such as internet queries and 
satellite imagery, as discussed in Chapter III. Once the key drivers have been identified, 
the United States should establish metrics for monitoring them with the aim of detecting 
migration stressors that reach their breaking points and intervening when necessary to 
prevent mass-migration flows.410 
In addition to examining key drivers of migration, the U.S. government should also 
examine flash points in countries with a path to the United States to determine which events 
in those countries might trigger mass migrations. For example, Guatemala both produces 
many migrants to the United States and appears among the top 10 countries most at risk 
 
410 Papademetriou and Hooper, Building Partnerships to Respond, 48. 
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from climate change.411 Climate change threatens food and water sources in Guatemala, 
so these stressors could lead to international migration.412 Therefore, the strategic foresight 
unit could remotely monitor crop yields and water levels in Guatemala using satellite 
technology already in use in other government agencies to aid its migration forecasting 
efforts in Guatemala. 
Once stressors and flash points are identified, the strategic foresight unit should 
explore ways to utilize technology to monitor such stressors. The unit should apply relevant 
technologies that can improve the accuracy of mass-migration anticipation and decide 
which modeling methods to use to synthesize this information. Once the countries, 
stressors, trigger points, and likely number of migrants are identified, the strategic foresight 
unit could select the data points it wants to examine, choose an appropriate modeling 
method, and begin the process of conducting migration modeling. However, migration 
modeling should be an iterative process that is continually updated and even migrated over 
to other modeling methods when necessary. 
Then, the U.S. government should examine demographics of countries at risk to 
narrow down the number of people likely to migrate to the United States. The 
mass-migration team could coordinate with the intelligence sector, the Department of 
State’s country condition experts, and any other relevant agencies to keep its finger on the 
pulse of potential triggers. The unit should also stay current on issues within those countries 
to modify the trigger points with current events. Thus, the capacity to work across 
governments is critical to the success of the strategic foresight unit. Any number of U.S. 
agencies have a nexus to mass migrations. If the strategic foresight unit decides that wage 
inequality is a key driver of migration in a particular country, it may need to work with the 
Department of Labor to learn about changes in that area or receive key insights to drive its 
modeling. Likewise, if the unit discovers that a country’s most-likely migration trigger 
 
411 “Latin America: Guatemala,” Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food 
Security, accessed March 20, 2021, https://ccafs.cgiar.org/regions/latin-america/guatemala. 
412 Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security; Johnson, “Using Maslow’s 
Hierarchy of Needs.” 
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point is hurricane, the unit may need access to updated weather reports from the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or the National Weather Service.  
The strategic foresight unit should be empowered to work with other agencies or 
use other forecasting tools as appropriate. It may choose to send out surveys to experts 
throughout the government and in the private sector using the Delphi method, conduct 
analysis within a broader scope of countries, or begin analyzing social-media data. The 
important thing is that the unit is given the freedom and autonomy to conduct its migration 
foresight activities as it sees fit, free from political pressure and unburdened from the 
day-to-day crises that plague other government units. 
The strategic foresight unit should share its findings in a report published at least 
every four years and in memoranda to decision-makers and other government agencies as 
needed in response to potential shock events. Clear communication pathways should be 
established between the strategic foresight unit and agencies involved in mass-migration 
anticipation and planning. Such information should be shared with U.S. immigration 
authorities, as well as the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, to aid in foreign assistance distributions with the goal of improving the 
countries’ resilience to flash points. Ideally, alleviating migration flash points could 
prevent mass migration to the United States.  
Once the strategic foresight unit is operational, it should begin a continuous process 
of monitoring migration stressors. It should use its models as well as access to other 
information to monitor migration stressors in identified countries so that it can establish 
baseline and escalated rates. It should also establish an early-warning system with 
thresholds for triggering responses. Once migration stressors begin to escalate, the unit 
should notify key decision-makers so they can decide whether to deploy humanitarian aid 
to assist in meeting the country’s needs. This information should also be communicated 
throughout U.S. immigration agencies, so they can prepare to deploy resources to the 
southwest border. At this point, the United States should coordinate with the U.S. Agency 
for International Development and the Department of State to increase funding and 
in-country response efforts to alleviate humanitarian crises and reduce migration stressors. 
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Such interventions, delivered at the correct time, could prevent a mass migration from 
occurring in the first place.  
Once triggering events begin to occur, the strategic foresight unit should also 
recommend that decision-makers mobilize an operational response unit to assume 
command and control over the mass migration. This operational response unit should 
comprise leaders within all agencies involved with the mass-migration event, including 
CBP, ICE, ORR, CIS, and FEMA. Command and control of the operational response unit 
should be clearly established and communicated so that agencies know they must obey 
orders and send resources as instructed by the operational response unit. The operational 
response unit will need access to funding to respond with a whole-of-government approach 
to mass-migration events. This will prevent the resource scarcity mindset that has caused 
interagency disputes in the past. This unit should begin building up capacity and sending 
resources to the border to respond to the mass-migration event and ensure a humanitarian 
crisis does not occur.  
It is paramount that U.S. immigration authorities work in tandem to prepare and 
respond to mass-migration events. Each agency has a unique role to play in addressing 
migrant flows, and the failure of even one entity to respond quickly can cause delays for 
all other agencies, not to mention delay processing times for migrants. This was 
demonstrated during the mass migration of the 2010s when a lack of detention space for 
family units and unaccompanied minors within the ICE and ORR network backed up the 
entire immigration system. Not having a consolidated command structure to prepare and 
respond to mass-migration events prevents U.S. immigration authorities from responding 
in a coordinated, efficient way. With the large number of government entities tasked to 
respond to a mass-migration event, it is paramount that such agencies work together 
seamlessly. Establishing a mass-migration operational response unit, similar to Homeland 
Security Task Force Southeast, with clear command and control and access to resources is 
critical for mounting a timely and effective mass-migration response. 
Once activated, the operational response unit can take over and begin monitoring 
migration flows. As the migrants begin traveling, the unit can utilize available technology, 
like internet queries, to gauge the likelihood of a mass-migration event. At this point, 
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communication with officials in country is critical so that the operational response unit can 
confirm whether sources on the ground are seeing the same thing that the data show. While 
the operational unit can be guided by and benefit from the groundwork laid by the strategic 
foresight unit, at this point, the strategic foresight unit hands off command and control of 
the event to the operational response unit. The strategic foresight unit should hand off 
control to the operational response unit because the former should always remain free to 
focus on strategic foresight and horizon scanning. If the unit must respond to current 
events, it will have to divert attention away from future planning, potentially missing the 
next threat on the horizon. Its vision should remain laser-focused on the future so that U.S. 
immigration authorities are not surprised by the next mass-migration event.  
By adopting this whole-of-government approach to mass-migration anticipation, 
the U.S. government can shift from a reactionary to an anticipatory stance in terms of mass-
migration planning. By knowing when, where, and how many migrants are likely to come, 
the U.S. government can be prepared for mass migrations at the southern border and 
hopefully take steps to prevent them from happening. By conducting real-time analysis to 
anticipate mass migrations before they occur, and swiftly responding if they do, the U.S. 
government can prevent humanitarian crises at the southwest border. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
One surprising thing this author found is that much of the research on immigration 
has been done in a vacuum. It seems that many of the researchers conducting this work are 
doing so within the very rigid parameters of their respective fields. A host of people have 
looked at this problem from a sociological perspective, from a demographic perspective, 
from the economics of migration, and from computer science, trying to create models to 
simulate these effects. Mass migration is a huge and complicated topic. It must be 
examined and addressed in a multi-disciplinary way if it is going to grasp the multitude of 
reasons people migrate. And it must be done in such a way that practitioners working to 
manage mass-migration events and the migrants themselves can benefit from it. 
One way to address the myriad disciplines in this study is to establish an 
independent mass-migration research entity or anticipation center within a university. This 
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center could partner with government entities, academia, and humanitarian organizations 
to address this important topic from a variety of perspectives. It could also serve as a funnel 
for information that can affect mass-migration flows. This mass-migration anticipation 
center could be a secondary option in case the government decides that creating a strategic 
foresight unit within DHS is too daunting a task. This would prevent the need to hire a 
substantial number of mass-migration analysts, data scientists, computer scientists, and 
demographers within the federal government. Instead, the U.S. government could offer 
grants to pay for this private research with the understanding that the data need to be shared 
with the government for use by U.S. immigration authorities.  
Ideally, employees of this center could be granted access to the same reports and 
access to government resources that the strategic foresight unit would be given, including 
country condition reports, intelligence reports, demographic information from the Social 
Security Administration, economic information from the Treasury and Labor departments, 
disease information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and all other 
information relating to mass-migration flows. 
This thesis has covered much ground, but I hope to demonstrate, more than 
anything, that anticipating mass-migration flows is possible and worth doing. The United 
States cannot continue to be surprised by mass-migration events at the southwest border. 
We cannot continue to allow mass migrations to turn into humanitarian crises. Conducting 
mass-migration foresight is going to be a colossal task, but the stakes are too high not to 
act. This is good work that is worth doing. 
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